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INTRODUCTION 
A.  Exclusive Jurisdiction Between Public and Private International Law 
In the recent past, prestigious courts around the world have refused 
to adjudicate cases relating to foreign registered or unregistered 
intellectual property rights (hereinafter: IPRs), where the proceedings 
concerned an IPR infringement claim or where the defendant in an IPR 
infringement action or the claimant in a declaratory action to establish 
that the IPR is not infringed pleaded that the IPR is invalid or void and 
that there is also no infringement of that right for that reason (so called 
validity issues incidentally raised).1 In these cases the refusal to 
adjudicate the foreign IPRs infringement and validity claims was 
grounded on exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction (exclusive 
jurisdiction) rules.2  According to those rules, the State that granted or 
recognized the IPR has the exclusive jurisdiction to address claims 
related thereto, independent of its also having personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant.  Among those decisions3 are the Supreme Court of 
Appeal of the South Africa Republic’s Gallo v. Sting Music4 decision of 
 
1.  The decisions on the validity issues incidentally raised have usually inter partes 
effects, whereas the judgments on validity issues principally raised have erga omnes effects.  
See also infra in the content of the paper.   
2.  Of a statutory or a case law nature, see infra.  
3.  See also the judgments referred to in Toshiyuki Kono & Paulius Jurčys, XVIIIth 
Int’l Congress on Comparative Law, Intellectual Property and Private Int’l Law (provisional 
draft of the general report) (July 2010), in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INT’L 
LAW § II.4 (Toshiyuki Kono ed., Martinus Nijhof) (forthcoming); and the decisions quoted by 
the following national reports on Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Matters of Intellectual 
Property, (forthcoming) id.; Marie-Christine Janssens, The Relationship between Intellectual 
Property Law and Int’l Private Law viewed from a Belgian Perspective § I.II.2.1.3; Joost Blom, 
Report for Canada (including Quebec), subsection II.A; Ivana Kunda, Report for Croatia, 
subsection I.B; Marie-Elodie Ancel, Report for France, subsection I.ii; Axel Metzger, Report 
for Germany, subsection I.2.a.(1); Vandana Singh, Report for India, subsection I.2; Nerina 
Boschiero and Benedetta Ubertazzi, Report for Italy, subsection II. case 2, available at 16 
Cardozo Electronic Law Bulletin 291 (2010), available at 
http://www.unipa.it/scienzepolitiche/files/Italian%20National%20Reports%20to%20Washing
ton%202010.pdf; Dai Yokomizo, Report for Japan, subsection 1.1.2; Alexandre Dias Pereira, 
Report for Portugal, subsection I.B.2.2; Damjan Možina for Slovenia, subsection I.II.1; Pedro 
De Miguel Asensio, Report for Spain, subsection 1.2.1-3; Amélie Charbon, Report for 
Switzerland, subsection I.1; Dick Van Engelen, Report for The Netherlands, subsection 3.6.    
4.  Gallo Africa Ltd. v. Sting Music (Pty) Ltd. 2010 (6) SA 329 (SCA) (S. Afr.), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2010/96.html.  This decision was delivered 
when this Paper had already been submitted for publication.  Thus, this Paper can only note 
the conclusion of the decision, according to which “South Africa court has no jurisdiction to 
hear copyright infringement claims in respect of foreign copyright.”  Id.  However, this 
conclusion is analogous, mutatis mutandis, to the Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth, [2009] 
EWCA (Civ) 1328 judgment’s conclusion that will be addressed here in detail.  Therefore, the 
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March 9, 2010; the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit’s 
January 2, 2007 decision in Voda v. Cordis Corp.;5 the U.K. Court of 
Appeal’s December 16, 2009 decision in Lucasfilm Entertainment Co. v. 
Ainsworth;6 and the Court of Justice of the European Union GAT 
decision of July, 13 2006.7 
 
remarks relating to the Lucasfilm decision may be extended, mutatis mutandis, to the South 
African Gallo judgment. 
5.  Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  See Jane Ginsburg, Jurisdiction 
and Recognition of Judgments under the ALI Principles, in LITIGATING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS DISPUTES CROSS-BORDER: EU REGULATIONS, ALI PRINCIPLES, CLIP 
PROJECT (Stefania Bariatti ed., CEDAM 2010). 
6.  Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328 (Eng.).  Jacob LJ 
delivered the court’s judgment which has not yet become res judicata.  On this judgment, see 
Paul Torremans, Lucasfilm v. Ainsworth, 7 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 
751 (2010); Andrew Dickinson, The Force be with the EU? Infringements of US Copyright in 
the English Courts, 2 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL L.Q. 181, 181 (2010).  On the 
Court of First Instance decision of this same case, see Graeme Austin, The Concept of 
“Justiciability” in Foreign Copyright Infringement Cases, 40 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 393 (2009).  See also the recent English judgment Royal Courts of Justice, 
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL, Crosstown Music Company 1, LLC v. Rive Droite Music Ltd., 
[2009] EWHC Civ 1222, partly available at http://vlex.co.uk/vid/hc07c01296-55141239 (in 
which an attempt by one party to argue for a wider application of the U.K. Court of Appeal 
Lucasfilm case failed). 
7.  The Court of Justice of the European Union is the former European Court of 
Justice, for simplicity reasons this court will hereafter be recalled as ECJ.  With this judgment 
the ECJ pronounced not on its jurisdiction, but rather on the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
EU member States.  See Case C-4/03, GAT v. LuK, 2006 E.C.R. I-6509.  For critics of this 
decision, see Annette Kur, A Farewell to Cross-Border Injunctions? The ECJ Decisions GAT 
v. LuK and Roche Nederland v. Primus and Goldenberg, 7 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 844 (2006); Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, Exclusive Juridiction 
and Cross Border IP (Patent) Infringement. Suggestions for Amendment of the Brussels I 
Regulation, available at http://www-cl-ip.eu; Lydia Lundstedt, In the Wake of GAT/LuK and 
Roche/Primus, 2 NIR 122, 123 (2008); Paul Torremans, The Widening Reach of Exclusive 
Jurisdiction: Where Can You Litigate IP Rights after GAT?, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 61 (Arnaud Nuyts ed., 2008); 
Marcus Norrgård, A Spider Without a Web? Multiple Defendants in IP Litigation, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (Leible & Ohly eds., 
2009); Luigi Fumagalli, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights Disputes Cross-Border: 
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments under the Brussels I Regulation 15 in LITIGATING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DISPUTES CROSS-BORDER: EU REGULATIONS, ALI 
PRINCIPLES, CLIP PROJECT (Stefania Bariatti ed., 2010); Annette Kur. & Benedetta 
Ubertazzi, The ALI Principles and the CLIP Project–a Comparison, section 1 and subsection 
2.c in LITIGATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DISPUTES CROSS-BORDER: EU 
REGULATIONS, ALI PRINCIPLES, CLIP PROJECT (Stefania Bariatti ed., 2010).  See also the 
national reports recalled at footnote 3 of this paper.  But Cf., Manlio Frigo, Proprietà 
intellettuale, Gli standards di tutela dell’UE a confronto con gli standard internazionali, 
Address at the Italian Society of International Law XV Congress in Bologna (June 10–11, 
2010), available at http://streaming.cineca.it/SIDI-
XV/play.php?dim_get=320&player_get=flash&flusso_get=flash (according to which the GAT 
decision should be positively evaluated since it grants the principle of legal certainty in 
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These decisions are grounded on the assumption that since IPRs 
relate to a State’s sovereignty or domestic policies, IPRs are granted 
through State acts and are limited to the territory of the State that 
granted them.  Therefore, if a State other than that which granted or 
recognized the IPR exercised jurisdiction, this State would create an 
unreasonable interference with the State who initially granted or 
recognized the IPR at stake.  To avoid this unreasonable interference, 
the petitioned courts decline jurisdiction in foreign IPRs cases.  This 
declination of jurisdiction is not the result of any general public 
international law obligation, but rather is a discretionary act of self-
restraint based on domestic rules of international procedural law 
grounded on reasons of comity to the courts and on the act of State 
doctrine.  (Hereafter, “comity to the courts” and the “act of State 
doctrine.”  These terms are interchangeable throughout this Paper.)8  
Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that these comity rules are of a 
domestic nature, the same rules are rooted in the concept of territorial 
sovereignty within a system of equal nation-States.  Thus, “even more 
important that the conflicts of law rules themselves are the basic 
contours of comity . . . namely”9 the goals that must be accomplished by 
adopting it, among which stays the need to avoid harmful effects on 
international stability and interaction among nations and “the practical 
desirability of making decisions which would ‘further the development 
of an effectively functioning international system.’”10  Therefore, “the 
question of extending comity touches upon issues concerning the 
interaction of sovereign nations—matters typically within the scope of 
public international law”11 and comity can be defined as a non-binding 
principle governing international affairs or as “a bridge between public 
 
conformity with Article 6 of the ECHR.  Indeed, as will be explained in greater detail infra, 
this last Article militates against exclusive jurisdiction provisions). 
8.  To consider the act of State doctrine as an extension of comity read Jake S. Tyshow, 
Informal Foreign Affairs Formalism: The Act of State Doctrine and the Reinterpretation of 
International Comity, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 278, 298 (2002).  This article also describes the 
similarities and the differences between comity and the act of State doctrine. 
9.  Nadine Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of 
International Parallel Proceedings, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 601, 623 (2006). 
10.  Id. at 622. 
11. Id. at 619.  See also Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: 
an Intersection between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 281 
(1982) (“the doctrine of comity is not a rule of public international law, but the term 
characterizes many of those same functional elements that define a system of international 
legal order”).  See also Thomas H. Hill, Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine. 
Theory and Policy in United States Law, 46 RABELSZ 126 (1982).  
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and private international law.”12 
The decisions here examined, then, seem in line with attempts to 
develop a general public international law theory of allocation of 
jurisdiction in civil matters that began in the 18th century in the 
Netherlands, that continued to develop in Anglo-American legal 
systems, that were popular in Germany around the turn of the 19th 
century13 that “have more recently been revived by [certain] public 
international lawyers,”14 and that are based on “comity” reasons.15  In 
contrast, this Paper adopts the opinion that “these attempts have been 
unsuccessful”;16 public international law does not limit a State’s exercise 
of jurisdiction inside its borders,17 and “public international law can play 
 
12.  See Calamita, supra note 9, at 619.  See also Jörn Axel KÄMMERER J.A., Comity, 
in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2006), 
http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_articles_by_author2?author=K%C3%A4mmerer,%20J%
C3%B6rn%20Axel&letter=K.  See also CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (2008). 
13.  See the studies of Ulrich Huber and Story, referred to by Maier, supra note 11, at 
280, (collecting and construing resources) and respectively the studies of Zitelmann and 
Frankenstein, referred to by Ralf Michaels, Public and Private International Law: German 
Views on Global Issues, 4 J. PUB. INT’L L. 125 (2008).  
14.  See Michaels, supra note 13.  
15.  Id. at 130.  See also Maier, supra note 11, at 281.  On comity as a PIL rule in 
general see Lawrence Collins, The United States Supreme Court and the Principles of Comity: 
Evidence in Transnational Litigation, 8 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 53 (2006); Donald Earl 
Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2010); Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot, On The International Comity 
In The Private International Law System Of The U.S.A, 19 Revista Electrónica de Estudios 
Internacionales 1 (2010) available at 
http://www.reei.org/reei19/doc/Nota_ZAMORA_FranciscoJavier.pdf.  On comity as a PIL 
rule with respect to IPRs, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS 
REGULATION 58 (Cambridge University Press 2000).  See also William Patry, Choice of Law 
and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 416 (2000), who, however, concentrates 
on copyright conflict of laws issues rather than on the international procedural matters 
examined here.   
16.  Michaels, supra note 13, at 125, 130.  See also ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW. JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERING OF PRIVATE LAW 23 (Cambridge 
University Press 2009).   
17.  Save in exceptional cases, such as those concerning subjects that are immune from 
foreign jurisdiction.  On the immunity from jurisdiction with respect to issues related to IPRs, 
see Virginia MORRIS, Sovereign Immunity: The Exception for Intellectual Property, 19 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 83, 115 (1986); Akihiro Matsui, Intellectual Property Litigation and 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity: International Law Limit to the Jurisdiction over the Infringement 
of Intellectual Property, INST. INTELL. PROP. BULL. 2003, available at 
http://www.iip.or.jp/e/summary/pdf/detail2002/e14_20.pdf; Benedetta Ubertazzi, Intellectual 
Property and State Immunity from Jurisdiction in the New York Convention of 2004, 11 Y.B. 
PRIVATE INT’L L. 599 (2009) (collecting and construing necessary case law references 
originating in different countries).  
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a role in private international law [only] in . . . the broader conception of 
human rights,”18 imposing on the States the granting of the right of 
access to courts and therefore the abandoning of their international 
jurisdiction provisions inconsistent with this right, namely the 
exorbitant19 and exclusive20 jurisdiction rules, of which this paper 
examines only the latter and in relation to IPRs. 
As a conclusion, this paper adopts and develops a thesis according to 
which exclusive jurisdiction rules in IPRs cases are not suggested by 
public international law; are actually illegal according to its rules on the 
denial of justice and on the fundamental human right of access to courts; 
and therefore, must be abandoned not only with respect to IPRs 
infringement issues, but also to IPRs validity claims raised as a defense 
in infringements proceedings, as the majority of the scholars maintain21 
and the most recent academic initiatives like the ALI Principles and the 
CLIP Project codify.22 
B.  Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives 
Finally, with respect to international jurisdiction, it is necessary to 
highlight that the basic terminology, and legal institutions adopted in 
Europe diverge considerably from those of the U.S. system, since 
“European law does not distinguish between personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction, whereas American law does not employ the 
categories of general, special and exclusive jurisdiction.”23  However, on 
 
18.  Michaels, supra note 13, at 125, 130 (collecting and construing resources).  
19.  See Carlo Focarelli, The Right of Aliens not to be Subject to So-Called “Excessive” 
Civil Jurisdiction, in ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 441 (Benedetto 
Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997); Diego P. Fernández Arroyo, Compétence 
exclusive et compétence exorbitante dans les relations privées internationales, 323 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 9 (2006); Giuditta Cordero Moss, Between Private and Public International Law: 
Exorbitant Jurisdiction as Illustrated by the Yukos Case, 32 REV.  CENT. E. EUROPEAN L. 1 
(2007); RYNGAERT, supra note 12, at 165; Nerina Boschiero, Las reglas de competencia 
judicial de la Unión Europea en el espacio jurídico internacional, 9 ANUARIO ESPAÑOL DE 
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 35, 47 (2009) (collecting and construing resources).  
See also the doctrine quoted infra  176. 
20.  For the abandoning of any exclusive jurisdiction provision see Fernández Arroyo, 
supra note 19, passim. 
21.  See the ALI Principles, infra note 84.  See the CLIP Principles, infra note 86.  
22.  The majority of the doctrine is against exclusive jurisdiction rules in relation to 
IPRs infringement proceedings and validity issues incidentally raised.  See the doctrine that 
severely criticizes the ECJ GAT decision indicated at supra note 6.  See also the doctrine 
mentioned at supra note 1.  Contra see Frigo, supra note 7.   
23.  Kur & Ubertazzi, supra note 7, at 140.  See also Anna Gardella & Luca Radicati di 
Brozolo, Civil Law, Common Law and Market Integration: EC Approach to Conflicts of 
Jurisdiction, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 611 (2003); Arnaud Nuyts, Due Process and Fair Trial: 
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the one hand, “American and European law provide functionally 
equivalent methods for resolving the same problems, [albeit] they 
cannot agree on, much less unify, these methods.”24  On the other hand, 
at least with respect to IPR cases, it seems that a “good part of the 
impression”25 that the two systems are “significantly different”26 “ensues 
from differences in style and structure rather than from differences in 
substance.”27  Therefore, although this Paper adopts the notion of 
exclusive jurisdiction, which is rooted in the European legal tradition 
rather than the U.S. categories of personal and subject matter 
jurisdictions, it aims at proposing and demonstrating a thesis applicable 
at least to both of these legal systems. 
 
I. THESES PURPORTING THAT COMITY, THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE 
AND THE TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE ESTABLISH IMPLICIT 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION RULES 
A.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Voda Judgment 
and the U.K. Court of Appeal Lucasfilm Decision 
In this framework, this Paper starts analyzing the first thesis, which 
purports that comity and the territoriality principle establish exclusive 
jurisdiction in the State courts that granted or recognized a registered or 
unregistered IPR, with respect to both its validity and infringement.28  
This thesis was recently adopted, inter alia, by two important sovereign 
court decisions, namely the Voda v. Cordis U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit judgment and the Lucasfilm Entertainment Co. v. 
Ainsworth U.K. Court of Appeal decision.  In the Voda case, the 
plaintiff, Voda, was a U.S. resident, while the defendant, Cordis, was a 
U.S.-based entity.29  Voda owned several U.S., European, British, 
Canadian, French, and German patents related to a single invention, 
 
Jurisdiction in the United States and in Europe Compared, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN EUROPE AND RELATIONS WITH THIRD STATES 157 (Arnaud Nuyts & 
Nadine Watté eds., 2005); Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
1003, 1011 (2006). 
24.  Michaels, supra note 23, at 1011. 
25.  Kur & Ubertazzi, supra note 7, at 92.  
26.  Michaels, supra note 23, at 1011. 
27.  Kur & Ubertazzi, supra note 7, at 92. 
28.  Principally or incidentally raised, see supra Section I, Introduction. 
29.  Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  For further details 
concerning this case, see also infra Section VI. Exclusive Jurisdiction Implies a Denial of 
Justice and Violates the Fundamental Human Right of Access to Courts. 
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which Voda claimed Cordis infringed.30  Cordis did not object to Voda’s 
claim of U.S. patent infringement, but opposed Voda’s infringement 
claims concerning the European, British, Canadian, French and German 
patents, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
such claims.31  The court accepted Cordis’ argument, and thus refused to 
examine Voda’s foreign patent infringement claims.32 
In Lucasfilm, the U.S. plaintiffs sued in a U.S. Court two defendants 
domiciled in the United Kingdom, claiming that the defendants had 
infringed the plaintiffs’ U.S. copyrights with respect to a number of 
works created for the film Star Wars.33  According to the plaintiffs, the 
defendants’ infringement activity was “all actually done in or from the 
U.K. [by virtue of] . . . sales to U.S. customers in the U.S. by dispatch of 
products from the U.K., advertising on the internet and the placing of 
advertisements in U.S. publications.”34  As the defendants did not 
appear before the court, the U.S. Court rendered default judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs condemning the defendant for infringing the 
plaintiffs’ U.S. copyrights.  The U.S. plaintiffs then asked a U.K. Court 
to enforce its U.S. judgment against the defendants domiciled in the 
United Kingdom.  The U.K. Court of Appeal denied this enforcement 
request, stating that since “the mere selling of goods from country A 
into country B does not amount to the presence of the seller in country 
B,”35 the defendants were not to be considered present in the United 
States under U.K. international jurisdiction rules that require a 
defendants’ physical presence in the forum State for the forum State’s 
courts to adjudicate a case against them.36  Therefore, the U.S. Court 
lacked personal jurisdiction to hear the case.37  In response, the U.S. 
plaintiffs asked the U.K. Court to start a new proceeding on the merits 
to “enforce the U.S. copyright”38 directly in the United Kingdom.  The 
U.K. Court of Appeal denied this request as well, holding that foreign 
IPRs are not enforceable in the United Kingdom.39  Indeed, the decision 
 
30.  Id. at 890. 
31.  Id. at 891. 
32.  Id. at 905. 
33.  Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328, ¶ 5 (Eng.).  For 
further details concerning this case, see also infra Section VI. Exclusive Jurisdiction Implies a 
Denial of Justice and Violates the Fundamental Human Right of Access to Courts. 
34.  Id. at 100. 
35.  Id. at 192. 
36.  See id. 
37.  See id. at 187–194. 
38.  Id. at 17. 
39.  Id. at 194. 
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of the U.K. Court of Appeal has not yet become a res judicata, since 
Lucasfilm appealed to the House of Lords/U.K. Supreme Court.40 
In both the Voda and Lucasfilm cases, the respective U.S. and U.K. 
Courts of Appeals reached their conclusions based on two different 
arguments related to comity and the territoriality principle.41  The first 
argument was grounded on the “act of State doctrine . . . [which] 
requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns 
taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid.”42  This 
argument purports that the rules that govern “relations between 
sovereigns’”43 and that establish “comity and the principle of avoiding 
unreasonable interference with the authority of other sovereigns”44 
 
40.  The U.K. Supreme Court is a new body meant to replace the House of Lords’ 
traditional power as the high court in the United Kingdom. 
41.  See supra, Section I. Introduction.  
42.  Voda, 476 F.3d at 904.  See the dissenting opinion of Judge Newman for a 
discussion on the act of State doctrine and on the reasons against its adoption in relation to 
IPRs; specifically quoting U.S. case law that “rejected the theory that ‘the mere issuance of 
patents by a foreign power constitutes either an act of state, as the term has developed under 
case law, or an example of governments’ compulsion.’”  Id.  See also Curtis Bradley, 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Intellectual Property Law: Territorial Intellectual Property 
Rights in an Age of Globalization, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997); Peter Nicolas, The Use of 
Preclusion Doctrine, Antisuit Injunctions, and Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals in 
Transnational Intellectual Property Litigation, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 331, 363 (1999), quoting 
relevant U.S. case law according to which  
 
in those cases in which the courts have traditionally invoked the act of 
state doctrine ‘the crucial acts occurred as a result of a considered policy 
determination by a government to give effect to its political and public 
interests[,] matters that would have significant impact on American 
foreign relations’.  In contrast, . . . the grant of a patent for floor coverings 
is merely a ‘ministerial activity’ and thus ‘not the type of sovereign activity 
that would be of substantial concern to the executive branch in its conduct 
of international affairs.’ 
   
The same conclusion is reached in relation to copyright by Graeme Dinwoodie, Conflicts and 
International Copyright Litigation: the Role of International Norms, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 210 (Jüergen Basedow, Josef Drexl, Annette Kur & 
Axel Metzger eds., 2005) and in relation to IPRs in general by Pedro De Miguel, Cross-border 
Adjudication of Intellectual Property Rights and Competition between Jurisdictions, 41 
ANNALI ITALIANI DEL DIRITO D’AUTORE 105, n.112 (2007).  On the act of State doctrine 
and on the reasons against its adoption in international public law in general, and thus not 
only with respect to IPRs, see BENEDETTO CONFORTI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE, 232 (7th 
ed. 2006).  
43.  Voda, 476 F.3d at 900. 
44.  Lucasfilm, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328 at 171 (recalling the Voda judgment).  On the 
comity reasons with respect to IPRs, see supra note 12, and note 43. 
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(general public international law rules)45 limit the exercise of 
international jurisdiction by a State on foreign matters that are the 
expression of another State’s sovereignty or domestic policies.  
Registered and unregistered IPRs are among those matters, since such 
rights are an expression of the sovereignty of the States that grant or 
recognize them,46 or are an expression of such State’s local policies and 
interests.47  As a consequence, both versions of this thesis—both the 
version of the Voda case and the Lucasfilm case respectively—advance 
that courts decline the exercise of their jurisdictions regarding matters 
related to both the validity and infringement of foreign IPRs, since “a 
world in which states regularly claimed jurisdiction over the property 
rights established by other nationals would be a world in which the 
principle of negative comity would have largely vanished.”48  Thus, both 
versions of this thesis posit that comity reasons implicitly establish 
exclusive jurisdiction in the State granting or recognizing each IPR with 
respect to the validity and infringement thereof. 
The second argument advanced in the Voda and Lucasfilm cases is 
grounded on the territoriality principle.49  According to this argument, 
 
45.  See supra, Section I. Introduction.  
46.  Voda, 476 F.3d at 902 according to which “[i]t would be incongruent to allow the 
sovereign power of one to be infringed or limited by another sovereign’s extension of its 
jurisdiction” with respect to a foreign patent infringement claim.  
47.  Lucasfilm, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328 [159, 176] according to which “[i]nfringement 
of an IP right (especially copyright, which is largely unharmonized) is essentially a local 
matter involving local policies and local public interest” and “enforcement may involve a 
clash of the IP policies of different countries.”  
48.  See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 15, at 58, explaining that this way of 
thinking originated in the beginning of the IPRs history, namely in the so called territorial 
period.  For the arguments against the adoption of comity reasons in the current IPRs era, so 
called globalized period, see the following remarks.  
49.  On the territoriality principle and on the reasons against its interpretation as an 
international jurisdiction rule in relation to IPRs, see Josef Drexl, Internationales 
Immateralgüterrecht, 11 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH 
819, 820 (2006); Nerina Boschiero, Il principio di territorialità in materia di proprietà 
intellettuale: conflitti di leggi e giurisdizione, 41 ANNALI ITALIANI DEL DIRITO D’AUTORE 34, 
99 (2007); Graeme Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: 
the Demise of Territoriality, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711 (2009); Alexander Peukert, 
Territoriality and Extraterritoriality in Intellectual Property Law, in  BEYOND 
TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
(GUNTHER Handl & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2011), available at http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/ifrv1/peukert/forschung/Territoriality_and_Extraterritoriality_in_Intellectual_Pr
operty_Law.pdf.  On a comparative analysis of the territoriality principle adopted as a 
conflict of law rule and on the current discussion concerning its appropriateness, see Riccardo 
Luzzatto, Problemi Internazionalprivatistici del Diritto di Autore, 25 RIVISTA DI 
INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 278, 278 (1989); Riccardo Luzzatto, Proprietà 
Intellettuale e Diritto Internazionale, in PROPRIETÀ INTELLETTUALE E CONCORRENZA 900, 
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the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (CUP),50 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(CUB),51 the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT),52 and the TRIPs 
agreement53 establish the principle of the independence of each State’s 
domestic IPR system, as well as the principle of territoriality of the 
enforcement of IPRs.  As both the domestic independence principle and 
the territorial enforcement principle are grounded on the territoriality 
principle, they will hereinafter be referred to collectively as the 
territoriality principle.  According to the argument advanced in the 
Voda and Lucasfilm cases, the territoriality principle implies the 
“independence of each country’s sovereign . . . system[] for 
adjudicating”54 its IPRs and does not allow any interference in the 
foreign country’s IPR system.  Within this framework, interference 
purportedly occurs whenever a domestic court adjudicates a foreign IPR 
 
901 (2004); BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 15, at 58.  See also Kono & Jurčys supra 
note 3, at n.1, subsection III.9.3. 
50.  Adopted in 1883, as amended on July 14, 1967, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#agreements and  
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/summary.jsp. 
51.  Adopted in 1886, as amended on September 28, 1979, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#agreements and  
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/summary.jsp.   
52.  Treaty of Washington adopted in 1970, as amended on October 3, 2001, available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#agreements and  
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/summary.jsp. 
53.  Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), 
annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in 
Marrakesh, Morocco on April 15, 1994, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#agreements and 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/summary.jsp for the text of this treaty.  The TRIPs agreement 
incorporates various IP conventional norms by reference, including the principles of 
territoriality and national treatment.  However, the TRIPs agreement also  
 
departs from the long tradition whereby international IP conventions 
confined themselves to imposing on Members only negative obligations, 
in particular by requiring national treatment of foreigners, and takes the 
unprecedented step of mandating positive obligations, including most-
favoured nation treatment and greatly expanding minimum IP protection 
standards.  
 
Marco Ricolfi, The First Ten Years of the TRIPs Agreement: Is There an Antitrust Antidote 
Against IP Overprotection Within TRIPs?, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 305, 331 (2006).   
See also Marco Ricolfi, The Interface between Intellectual Property and International Trade: 
the TRIPs Agreement, ITALIAN INTELL. PROP. 29 (Jan. 2002); Christopher Wadlow, 
“Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods”: The Origins of TRIPs as a GATT Anti-counterfeiting 
Code, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 350 (2007). 
54.  Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 899 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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issue.  Thus, it is argued that the territoriality principle proscribes such 
adjudication.  The absence of an “express jurisdictional-stripping 
statute”55 in the CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs agreements is alleged to 
lend further support to this position, since nothing in these treaties 
“contemplates or allows one jurisdiction to adjudicate [the] patents of 
another [country].”56  In conclusion, this argument purports that the 
CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs agreements establish an implicit exclusive 
jurisdiction rule with respect to both IPR validity and infringement 
disputes. 
B.  The ECJ (CJEU) GAT Decision 
Like the two versions of the first thesis presented, a second thesis 
also maintains that implicit exclusive jurisdiction rules exist with respect 
to IPRs.  However, this thesis differs from the previous in that, firstly, 
the exclusive jurisdiction rule covers only registered IPRs and does not 
encompass unregistered IPRs; and secondly, the exclusive jurisdiction 
rule covers the proceedings related to the validity of the IPR but does 
not encompass its infringement claims.57  This thesis forms the basis of 
Article 16.4 of the Brussels Convention, now Article 22.4 of the Brussels 
I Regulation.58  (Hereinafter, the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I 
Regulation are jointly referred to as “the Brussels System” together 
with the Lugano Convention).59  Hence, according to the Jenard Report 
to the Brussels Convention, 
 
[s]ince the grant of a national patent is an exercise of 
national sovereignty, Article 16(4) of the Judgments 
Convention provides for exclusive jurisdiction in 
proceedings concerned with the validity of patents.  
Other actions, including those for infringement of 
patents, are governed by the general rules of the 
Convention.60 
 
55.  Id.  
56.  Id.  See also Lucasfilm, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328 [179–180]. 
57.  Principally or incidentally raised, see supra Section I. Introduction. 
58.  The Regulation 44/2001, in 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, transformed into a Community legal 
instrument (communitarized) the Brussels convention on jurisdiction and recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters of Sept. 27, 1968.    
59.  See The Lugano Convention May 30, 2007, concluded between the EC and certain 
member States of EFTA: Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and related to jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32007D0712:EN:NOT.  
60.  1979 O.J. (C 59) 36.  See also Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
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This thesis was also adopted and developed further by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in its interpretation of the scope of Article 16.4 
of the Brussels Convention (now 22.4 of the Brussels I Regulation) in 
two cases.  In the first case, the Duijnstee case, Mr. Duijnstee, a 
liquidator in the dissolution of a company, applied to the Maastricht 
Arrondissementsrechtbank for an interlocutory injunction requiring Mr. 
Goderbauer, the former manager of the company, to transfer to Mr. 
Duijnstee the patents, both applied for and granted, in twenty-two 
countries for an invention that Mr. Goderbauer made while employed 
by the company.61  The proceeding came before the Hoge Raad, which 
in turn stayed and referred to the ECJ the preliminary question of 
“whether the concept of proceedings ‘concerned with the registration or 
validity of patents’ within the meaning of Article 16 (4) of the [Brussels] 
Convention . . . may cover a dispute such as that concerned in the main 
action”62 namely, a dispute having as its subject-matter a transfer of 
IPRs.  The ECJ answered that Article 16.4 does not cover such 
disputes.63 
In the second case, the GAT case, the plaintiff LuK, sued GAT 
before the Landgericht Düsseldorf.64  Here, both the plaintiff and 
defendant were companies established in Germany.  LuK’s complaint 
alleged that GAT had infringed two of LuK’s French patents.  GAT 
responded by bringing a declaratory action before the Düsseldorf Court, 
asking the court to establish that GAT was not in breach of LuK’s 
patents, as such patents were either void or invalid.  The 
Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf stayed the proceeding and asked the ECJ 
if the exclusive jurisdiction of Article 16.4 of the Brussels Convention 
 
only applies if proceedings (with erga omnes effect) are 
brought to declare the patent invalid or are proceedings 
concerned with the validity of patents within the 
meaning of the aforementioned provision where the 
 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed in Lugano on 30 October 
2007.  Explanatory Report by Professor Fausto Pocar (Holder of the Chair of International 
Law at the University of Milan) in 2009 O.J. (C 319) 25. 
61.  Case 288/82, Duijnstee v. Goderbauer, 1983 E.C.R. 3663, ¶ 3. 
62.  Id. at ¶¶ 19–20. 
63.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
64. Case C-4/03, GAT v. LuK, 2006 E.C.R. I-6509, ¶ 10.  For further details concerning 
this case, see also infra Section VI. Exclusive Jurisdiction Implies a Denial of Justice and 
Violates the Fundamental Human Right of Access to Courts. 
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defendant in a patent infringement action or the claimant 
in a declaratory action to establish that a patent is not 
infringed pleads that the patent is invalid or void and 
that there is also no patent infringement for that reason, 
irrespective of whether the court sei[z]ed of the 
proceedings considers the plea in objection to be 
substantiated or unsubstantiated and of when the plea in 
objection is raised in the course of proceedings.65 
 
The ECJ answered that “the rule of exclusive jurisdiction laid down [by 
Article 16.4 of the Convention] . . . concerns all proceedings relating to 
the registration or validity of a patent, irrespective of whether the issue 
is raised by way of an action or a plea in objection.”66 
In both the Duijnstee and the GAT cases, the ECJ reached its 
conclusions on the basis of the following main arguments.  First, 
according to the ECJ, “exclusive jurisdiction is justified by the fact that 
the issue of patents necessitates the involvement of the national 
administrative authorities.”67  Here, the ECJ references the Jenard 
Report, according to which the granting of a patent is an “exercise of 
national sovereignty.”68  This statement makes apparent that the Jenard 
Report is grounded on the act of State doctrine.  Accordingly, the ECJ 
decisions citing it are also based on the act of State doctrine. 
Furthermore, the act of State doctrine is adopted to ground the 
scope of the exclusive jurisdiction rule advanced by the second thesis.  
According to this thesis, the exclusive jurisdiction rule covers only 
registered IPRs and does not apply to unregistered IPRs.  The reason 
for this distinction is that registered IPRs are granted through a public 
act of concession, which implies the intervention of the national 
administration and, therefore, the “exercise of national sovereignty,” 
whereas unregistered IPRs come into being without these formalities.  
Also, according to this thesis, exclusive jurisdiction rules cover the 
proceedings related to the validity of IPRs,69 but do not encompass 
related infringement claims.  Such divergent treatment is premised on 
the argument that proceedings concerning an IPR’s validity actually 
 
65.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
66.  Id. at ¶ 31. 
67.  Id. at ¶ 23.  
68.  P. Jenard, Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 36. 
69.  Principally or incidentally raised, see supra Section I. Introduction.  
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question or challenge the validity of its granting acts; whereas 
proceedings related to infringement concern only the activity of private 
subjects.  Thus, since the granting act is an act of the national 
administration of the granting State, this act is argued to be an 
expression of the State’s sovereignty, leading to the second thesis’ 
conclusion that validity proceedings imply an examination of the 
sovereign activity of foreign States. 
In contrast with the ECJ’s embracing of the first argument of the 
first thesis, namely, the act of State doctrine, the ECJ has refused to 
adopt the second argument of the first thesis, which purports that the 
CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs agreements also implicitly establish an 
exclusive jurisdiction rule.  To understand the ECJ’s position with 
regard to the CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs agreements, it is relevant to 
briefly review the Tod’s case.  In that case, “[h]aving learnt that [a 
French company] was offering for sale and selling under [its] name 
designs of shoes which copied or at least imitated the principal 
characteristics of the [Italian companies] Tod’s and Hogan, designs,”70 
Tod’s brought an action for infringement of registered designs for shoes 
bearing the Tod’s and Hogan trademarks in the French Court.71  The 
French company countered with a plea of inadmissibility contending 
that, under the Berne Convention, Tod’s was not entitled to claim 
copyright protection in France for designs that did not qualify for such 
protection in Italy.72  The French Court stayed the proceeding and asked 
the ECJ to establish if 
 
Article 12 EC, which lays down the general principle of 
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, mean that 
the right of an author to claim in a Member State the 
copyright protection afforded by the law of that State 
may not be subject to a distinction based on the country 
of origin of the work[.]73 
 
The ECJ considered that “the purpose of that convention is not to 
determine the applicable law on the protection of literary and artistic 
works, but to establish, as a general rule, a system of national treatment 
 
70.  Case C-28/04, Tod’s SpA, Tod’s France SARL v. Heyraud SA, 2005 E.C.R. I-5783, 
¶ 7, available at www.curia.eu.int.   
71.  Id. at ¶¶ 1–8. 
72.  Id. at ¶ 8. 
73.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
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of the rights appertaining to such works.”74  Therefore, the ECJ 
answered that 
 
Article 12 EC . . . must be interpreted as meaning that 
the right of an author to claim in a Member State the 
copyright protection afforded by the law of that State 
may not be subject to a distinguishing criterion based on 
the country of origin of the work.75 
 
The ECJ’s conclusions that the CUB does not relate to private 
international law and therefore, does not determine any applicable laws, 
but instead establishes that a national treatment principle of a 
substantive nature, may be applied to the CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs 
agreements, and also to international procedural law.  Interpreted in 
this way, the ECJ’s Tod’s decision determines that the territoriality 
principle of the CUP, PCT, and TRIPs agreements not only does not 
refer to applicable law, but also does not posit an implicit exclusive 
jurisdiction rule. 
II. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION RULES ARE NOT ESTABLISHED EITHER 
BY COMITY OR BY THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE AND THE 
TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE, BUT RATHER ARE RENDERED ILLEGAL 
BY THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES ON THE RIGHT OF 
ACCESS TO COURTS: THE SUBJECT MATTER AND DELIMITATION OF 
THIS RESEARCH 
The two theses on exclusive jurisdiction just discussed, the first in 
the Voda and Lucasfilm cases, and the second in the ECJ judgments, are 
not convincing for two reasons.  Each reason is related to the 
unacceptability of the arguments in their favor when considered in the 
context of public international law.  The first argument advanced in 
support of these theses, based on the act of State doctrine and comity 
reasons, respectively, is not convincing for reasons that I will explain 
and demonstrate in detail in the second chapter of my forthcoming book 
on exclusive jurisdiction in IPRs cases. 
For present purposes, I will simply state that IPRs are not an 
expression of the sovereignty or local policies of their granting or 
recognizing States but are “private rights,”76 albeit where registered, 
 
74.  Id. at ¶ 32. 
75.  Id. at ¶ 37. 
76. European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, 
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they come into being with conditions of formalities, namely through an 
administrative act.  Furthermore, albeit arguendo if these administrative 
acts were to be considered as acts of State,77 characterizing them as such 
would not impede the exercise of jurisdiction by a foreign country over 
issues concerning the validity thereof,78 provided that comity reasons 
and the act of State doctrine do not rest on general public international 
law grounds, that general public international law does not limit a 
State’s exercise of jurisdiction inside its borders even with respect to 
acts of States, and especially that “there is [even] an infringement of the 
right of access to a court where a case is dismissed under the act of state 
doctrine.”79  Finally, the adoption of comity reasons in relation to the 
international jurisdiction aspects of IPRs was understandable at the 
beginning of the IPRs history.  Namely, in the so-called “territorial 
period,” where an intimate connection between sovereignty, IPRs, and 
territory existed; however, the adoption of comity reasons is not 
justified today, where the IPRs international and global periods that 
followed the territorial period produced the harmonization of the 
procedural and substantive laws regarding IPRs, with “a spectacular 
impact [on, and in] sharp contrast [with,]”80 the sovereignty (personality 
and territoriality) logics. 
The second argument advanced in support of these theses that is 
grounded on the territoriality principle is not convincing either, for 
reasons that I will address in detail in the third chapter of my 
forthcoming book.  Accordingly, I simply state here that the 
territoriality principle adopted by the CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs 
agreements does not ground any exclusive jurisdiction rules of an 
implicit nature,81 and that, even when the territoriality principle is at the 
base of explicit international jurisdiction provisions posed by legal 
 
Principles for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, Second Preliminary Draft, 7 (2009), 
available at http://www.ip.mpg.de/shared/data/pdf/draft-clip-principles-06-06-
2009_version_2.pdf.  However, the reference to the nature of “private rights” is not present in 
the third Preliminary Draft of the CLIP Principles (September 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.ip.mpg.de/shared/data/pdf/draft-clip-principles-01-09-2010_version_3.pdf. 
77.  However, on their not being characterized as acts of State see supra note 29. 
78.  Principally or incidentally raised, see supra Section I. Introduction. 
79.  As such Tobias Thienel, The Act of State Doctrine: In Violation of International 
Law (Part 3), (Oct. 23, 2006) available at http://corelaw.blogspot.com/2006/10/act-of-state-
doctrine-in-violation-of.html.  See also supra Section I. Introduction, and infra Section VI. 
Exclusive Jurisdiction Implies a Denial of Justice and Violates the Fundamental Human Right 
of Access to Courts.  
80.  See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 15, at 58. 
81.  On the territoriality principle and on the reasons against its interpretation as a 
conflict of jurisdiction provision in relation to IPRs, see the doctrine mentioned supra note 45. 
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instruments other than the CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs agreement, the 
territoriality principle should be interpreted according to the “proximity 
principle,” which cannot be addressed in this paper other than by saying 
that such can never ground exclusive jurisdiction rules (as will be 
demonstrated in the third chapter of my forthcoming book). 
The two theses of exclusive jurisdiction are also not convincing for a 
third reason related to public international law.  That is, exclusive 
jurisdiction rules violate the right of access to courts.  This right is 
granted by both general international law rules and by international 
conventions establishing the avoidance of a denial of justice, the 
doctrine (rule) of forum necessitatis, and the fundamental human right 
of access to courts.  Thus, by violating the right of access to courts, 
exclusive jurisdiction provisions violate public international law.  This, 
in turn, not only does not impose implicit exclusive jurisdiction rules, 
but rather, renders them illegal.  The demonstration of this conclusion is 
the subject matter of this study. 
However, this study does not examine private international law 
issues related to the contractual circulation of IPR, defined also as 
“secondary” IPR law.82  Rather, this study concentrates on the 
“primary” or “proprietary” issues related to IPRs, which comprise 
matters of the ownership, validity and existence of such rights as well as 
the transferability, scope, and infringement thereof.  Hence, exclusive 
jurisdiction rules relate to the latter, not the former, matters. 
This study presupposes a comparative analysis, which will be 
rendered in the first chapter of my forthcoming book, of explicit 
exclusive jurisdiction rules of case law and of a statutory nature, 
between domestic or conventional origin, and between hard law or soft 
law character.83  This study will, then, refer to the specific exclusive 
jurisdiction rules only where necessary to demonstrate the herein 
proposed conclusion. 
Moreover, this study is grounded on the premise, which will be 
demonstrated in the first chapter of the forthcoming book, that 
exclusive jurisdiction rules are not the expression of a rule of customary 
international public law.  Here it is sufficient to state that the majority of 
States adopt statutory or case law rules concerning exclusive jurisdiction 
 
82.  On the EU jurisdiction related to the contractual circulation of IPRs, see Bendetta 
Ubertazzi, Licence Agreements Related to IP Rights and the EC Regulation on Jurisdiction, 40 
INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 912 (2009) (collecting and construing 
resources).  
83.  On a comparative analysis of the exclusive jurisdiction rules, see the general and 
national reports, supra note 1.  
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only with respect to validity issues of registered IPRs and only when 
such issues are principally raised.  In contrast, these exclusive 
jurisdiction rules do not extend to either infringement claims or validity 
issues incidentally raised for registered IPRs or to claims related to the 
infringement or validity of unregistered IPRs, however raised.  Also, the 
ALI Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in 
Transnational Disputes, adopted on May 14, 2007,84 do not adopt the 
model of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Voda v. 
Cordis decision but, in contrast, limit the scope of the exclusive 
jurisdiction (subject matter jurisdiction) rule to registered IPRs validity 
issues principally addressed; however, these principles do not also 
extend protection to unregistered IPRs or to registered IPRs 
incidentally raised validity issues, nor to infringement claims.85 
The same limited scope of exclusive jurisdiction is adopted by the 
CLIP, Principles for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property third 
 
84.  See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES 
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL 
DISPUTES, (2008).  On the ALI Principles, see Kono, Intellectual Property Rights, Conflict of 
Laws and International Jurisdiction: Applicability of ALI Principles in Japan, 30 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 865 (2004–2005); Catherine Kessedjian, Current International Development in Choice 
of Law: An Analysis of the ALI Draft, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 19 (Basedow, Drexl, Kur & Metzger eds., Tübingen 2005); Alex Metzger, Transfer of 
Rights, License Agreements, and Conflict of Laws: Remarks on the Rome Convention of 1980 
and the Current ALI Draft, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS n. 61 
(Basedow, Drexl, Kur & Metzger eds., Tübingen 2005); Francois Dessemontet, Resolution 
Through Conflict of Laws: A European Point of View on the ALI Principles—Intellectual 
Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational 
Disputes, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 849, 850 (2005); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Resolution Through 
Conflict of Laws: The ALI Principles on Transnational Intellectual Property Disputes: Why 
Invite Conflicts?, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 819 (2005); Frank Beckstein, The American Law 
Institute Project on Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, 
and Judgments in Transnational Disputes. Summary of the Presentation given by Rochelle 
Dreyfuss, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (Stefan 
Leible and Ansgar Ohly eds., 2009); Moura Vicente, La propriété intellectuelle en droit 
international privé, 335 RECUEIL DES COURS 424 (2008); Kur & Ubertazzi, supra note 7, 
passim (collecting and construing resources); Axel Metzger, Jurisdiction in Cases Concerning 
Intellectual Property Infringements on the Internet, Brussels-I-Regulation, ALI-Principles and 
Max Planck Proposals, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
251 (Stefan Leible and Ansgar Ohly eds., 2009).  See also the doctrine quoted supra note 3.   
85.  The ALI Principles permit, then, the competent court to adjudicate claims arising 
under foreign laws (Article 211.1). Indeed, those principles limit the effectiveness of a court 
decision holding invalid the registered rights granted under the law of another State.  Hence, 
Article 211.2 of the ALI principles states that such a decision shall be effective only between 
parties but does not affect the validity or registration of the IP rights in question as against 
third parties.  The same result is reached under Arts. 213.2 and 213.3 of the ALI principles, 
concerning proceedings to obtain a declaration of invalidity of registered IP rights.  See Kur 
& Ubertazzi, supra note 7, at subsection II. c. 
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preliminary draft,86 which was published on September 1, 2010, and by 
other academic Principles currently being negotiated in certain Asian 
countries.87  Hence, inter alia, the CLIP Principles do not adopt the 
model of the ECJ’s GAT decision and establish exclusive jurisdiction 
criteria only for disputes related to validity issues principally raised 
concerning registered IP rights.88  Moreover, except for the Brussels 
Convention, which extended the scope of exclusive jurisdiction 
implicitly, and the Lugano Convention, which extended the scope of 
exclusive jurisdiction explicitly,89 to registered IPRs validity issues 
incidentally raised, exclusive jurisdiction rules concerning IPRs cases 
even with a limited scope cannot be found in any other international 
conventions.  In contrast, the inclusion of such exclusive jurisdiction, 
even with a limited scope, in The Hague Draft Convention on 
 
86.  See EUROPEAN MAX PLANCK GROUP ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, Third Preliminary Draft supra note 76.  On the CLIP Principles see Kur & 
Ubertazzi, supra note 7 passim; METZGER, Jurisdiction, supra note 84, at  251; De Miguel 
Asensio, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Intellectual Property Litigation: The 
CLIP Principles, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL ARENA: JURISDICTION, 
APPLICABLE LAW, AND THE RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE 
US, (Jurgen Basedow,  Toshiyuki Kono, and Axel Metzger eds., 2010) (forthcoming), 
available at http://eprints.ucm.es/9841/1/PdeMiguelREC-ENF-CLIP.pdf, at 251; Axel 
Metzger, Applicable Law under the CLIP-Principles: A Pragmatic Revaluation of 
Territoriality, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL ARENA: JURISDICTION, 
APPLICABLE LAW, AND THE RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE 
US, (Jurgen Basedow,  Toshiyuki Kono, & Axel Metzger eds., 2010) (forthcoming), available 
at http://www.iri.uni-hannover.de/tl_files/Materialien/Metzger/Publikationen/Metzger-
ApplicableLawUnderCLIP2010.pdf. See also the doctrine quoted supra note 3. 
87.  See the Transparency Proposal from Japan, the Waseda Proposal from South-East 
Asia, the Korean Proposal from Korea and the MOJ Proposal from Japan, and for all 
extensively see Kono & Jurčys, supra note 3, at § I.1.  
88.  Thus, in disputes having as their object a judgment relating to the grant, 
registration, validity, abandonment or revocation of a patent, a mark, an industrial design or 
any other IP right protected on the basis of registration, Article 2:401.1 grants exclusive 
jurisdiction to the courts in the State where the IP right was registered or is deemed to have 
been registered.  In any case, Article 2:401.2, first sentence, clarifies that Article 2:401.1 does 
not apply where the validity or registration of the registered IP right is challenged in a context 
other than by principal claim or counterclaim. Indeed, Article 2:401.2, second sentence, 
establishes that decisions arising from such disputes do not affect the validity or registration 
of the IP rights questioned as against third parties.  Finally, Article 2:402 on Obligation of 
other courts states that “where a court of a state is seized of a claim which has as its object a 
matter over which the courts of another state have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 
2:401, it shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction.”  It is relevant to remember 
that the first Draft of the CLIP principles of April 2009 established an exclusive jurisdiction 
also for unregistered IP rights.  See Kur & Ubertazzi, supra note 7, at subsection II.c. 
89.  See the ECJ GAT decision, supra note 7; see Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (l319) 
9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 Article 22. 4 of the Lugano Convention. 
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international jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgments of 1999,90 
was one of the principal reasons for the failure of that draft.  Articles 
12.4 and 12.5 of the draft granted exclusive jurisdiction in IP cases to the 
courts of the contracting State in which the deposit or registration had 
been applied for, had actually taken place, or was deemed to have taken 
place, but did not extend it either to copyright and related rights, or to 
infringement issues, nor to validity issues incidentally raised.91  Despite 
this limited scope, the issue of exclusive jurisdiction grounded in the 
provision in question, was extensively debated; since, during the 
negotiation proceedings, common law-jurisdiction countries (United 
States, England, and Australia) and representatives of business even 
questioned the overall necessity of exclusive jurisdiction rules.92 
In this context, it is reasonable to conclude that exclusive jurisdiction 
rules are not grounded in the States’ opinio juris ac necessitatis but 
 
90.  Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and the Effects of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (DHJC), June 18, 1999, with an explanatory report by Peter Nygh & 
Fausto Pocar, (HC) Prel. Doc. No. 11, available at (Fausto Pocar & Costanza Honorati eds., 
2005) The Hague Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments: Proceedings 
of the Round Table held at Milan University on 15 November 2003, Milan, Cedam, 2005 
(Nygh/Pocar Report), p. 209.  The text of the DHJC is available ibidem.  For the history of 
the draft convention and the ensuing developments, see Id.  See also Schulz, The Hague 
Conference Project for a Global Convention on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement in 
Civil and Commercial Matters: An Update, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HEADING FOR THE FUTURE 5 (Josef Drexl & Annette Kur eds., 
2005).  With respect to IPRs see Annette Kur, International Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments: A Way Forward for IP?  E.I.P.R. 175 (2002); Petkova Svetozara, The 
Potential Impact of the Draft Hague Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters on Internet-related Disputes with Particular 
Reference to Copyright, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 173 (2004).   
91.  See Arts.12.4 and 12.5 of the Draft Nygh/Pocar report, supra note 90, at 261; Kono 
& Jurčys, supra note 3, at § 4.1. 
92.  According to those countries, the mere fact of deposit or registration of IPRs 
might confer jurisdiction upon the courts of a country which has no jurisdiction over the 
defendant (in personam jurisdiction).  Permanent Bureau, Preliminary Document No.13, 
Report of the experts meeting in the intellectual property aspects of the future Convention on 
jurisdiction and foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters (February 1, 2001), 
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd13.pdf.  By contrast, for the Switzerland 
and Scandinavian delegations the court of the place of registration has exclusive jurisdiction 
over the matters related to validity while courts hearing infringement claims have to stay the 
proceeding until the validity issue is decided, see Preliminary Document No.13, at 4–5.  For an 
overview of all the other delegations’ opinions, see Preliminary Document No.13, at 4–6.  See 
also Nygh/Pocar report, supra note 90, at 261; Kono & Jurčys, supra note 3, at § 4.1.  
According to the reporters of the Draft Convention, then, the definition of the proceedings 
related to IPRs was one of the most troublesome questions to address during the negotiation 
proceedings of the 1999 Hague draft and was also one of the main reasons why especially the 
U.S. delegation opposed to the 1999 leading to its partial failure.  See Nygh/Pocar report 
supra note 90, at n. 261. 
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rather on criticizable political and opportunistic reasons.  This statement 
is in line with the uncontroversial thesis regarding issues related to the 
absolute rights concerning not IP but immovable objects.  According to 
this thesis, even though certain domestic or conventional norms of a soft 
law or a hard law nature allocate international jurisdiction exclusively to 
the courts of the State where the immovable object is located, those 
norms are not the expression of a rule of customary public international 
law.93 
Finally, even though, arguendo, exclusive jurisdiction rules are to be 
considered the expression of a rule of customary international public 
law, this rule is overridden by another rule of general international 
public law, being constituted by the general principle of international 
and EU law of forum necessitatis, and of the fundamental human right 
of access to courts, that will be examined later by this Paper.94  Hence, 
the sovereign reasons found at the basis of allegedly existing exclusive 
jurisdiction customary rules cannot prevail over the fundamental human 
right of access to courts, which grounds the general legal principle of 
forum necessitatis and of the same right of access to courts. 
This study does not examine the other possible arguments that are 
generally invoked in favor of exclusive jurisdiction rules.  However, 
some examples of these arguments are (1) that those rules derived from 
“the principle of non-justiciability for claims concerning foreign land, 
established over a century ago in the Moçambique case,”95 (2) that the 
same rules promote the “sound administration of justice”96 and “judicial 
economy,”97 (3) that the “best place[] to adjudicate” IP disputes is in the 
courts of the State that granted or recognized the IP right, 98 and (4) that 
 
93.  See G.L. TOSATO, LA GIURISDIZIONE VOLONTARIA NEL PROCESSO 
VOLONTARIO 19 (Milano, Giuffrè, 1971). 
94.  Hereafter, for the purposes of this Paper only, the general principle of 
international and EU law for simplicity will be referred to as general principle of law. 
95.  Dickinson, supra note 6, at 183.  See also Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth, 
[2009] EWCA Civ 1328 [174–186], recalling the Moçambique case, and Torremans, supra 
note 6, at 753, according to whom the Moçambique case  
 
is a case about immovable property, and the argument that intellectual 
property is similar to immovable property has really had its day.  And in 
as far as subject matter jurisdiction is at issue there is simply no way it can 
find its way into the [Brussels I] Regulation; the Moçambique case is 
irrelevant on this point. 
 
96.  C-4/03, GAT v. LuK, 2006 E.C.R. I-6509, ¶ 22. 
97.  Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
98.  Case 288/82, Duijnstee v. Goderbauer, 1983 E.C.R. 3663, ¶ 22. 
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the difficulties of applying in the forum State court the foreign IP law of 
the State that granted or recognized the IPR are too great.99  
Accordingly, this study does not expose the arguments against these 
reasons since, first, they are not primarily related to international public 
law, and, second, they will be examined in the last chapter of my 
forthcoming book.100 
This study does not examine whether IPRs validity and infringement 
issues or the provisional injunctions related to the IPRs matters can be 
arbitrated, notwithstanding the fact that the submission of these issues 
to arbitration tribunals and courts that are different than those of the 
States that granted the IPR at hand derogates from the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts of the State granting or recognizing the IPR.101  
Once again, this argument is not related to international public law and 
will be examined in the last chapter of the forthcoming book. 
This study does not address the issue of the recognition and 
execution of foreign judgments in IPRs cases.102  Thus, although it is true 
 
99.  See Mars Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
100.  Book mentioned at p. 373. 
101.  On the arbitrability of IPRs validity (inter partes) and infringement issues see 
Section II, case 11.4, of each national report on Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Matters of 
Intellectual Property, supra note 3.  On the competence of the courts different than the courts 
of the States that granted the IPR at hand to render provisional injunctions also when the 
validity of the litigious IPR is disputed, see the recent decision of the District Court of The 
Hague Fort Vale/Pelican, June 18, 2008, according to which the ECJ GAT decision does not 
preclude this result.  But see also the District Court of The Hague decision of September 15, 
2010, that refers questions to the ECJ regarding the applicability to provisional measures of 
Article 22.4 of the Brussels I Regulation and of the ECJ GAT decision (NL - Solvay S.A. v. 
Honeywell / Referral to Court of Justice EU, Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Fluorine Products 
Europe B.V., District Court The Hague, The Netherlands, 15 September 2010, Case No. 09-
2275, available at http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2010/09/nl-solvay-sa-v-honeywell-
referral-to-court-of-justice-eu.html#tp  (In Dutch). 
102.  On this issue see the following recent decisions: Case C-38/98, Régie Nationales 
des Usines Renault SA v. Maxicar SpA, 2000 E.C.R., available at www.curia.eu; Louis Feraud 
Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y 2005); Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf 
Inc., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612 (Can.), available at 
http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2006/2006scc52/2006scc52.html.  On those decisions see M. 
Trimble Landova, Public Policy Exception to Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
cases of Copyright Infringement, 40 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 654 
(2009).  See also Kono & Jurčys, supra note 3, at part IV; and the national reports on 
Jurisdiction and applicable Law in Matters of Intellectual Property, supra note 3, at the 
following: M.C. Janssens for Belgium, Subsection I.II.4; J. Blom for Canada (including 
Quebec), subsection II.A.iii; I. Kunda for Croatia, subsection I.D; M.E. Ancel for France, 
subsection I.iv; A. Metzger for Germany, subsection I.1.d).(1)-(3); V. Singh for India 
Subsection 2.2.10; N. Boschiero and B. Ubertazzi for Italy, subsection I.iv and Subsection II. 
case10; D. Yokomizo for Japan, subsection 2.2.10; A. Dias Pereira for Portugal, subsection 
I.D; D. Možina for Slovenia, subsection II, case 10; P. De Miguel Asensio for Spain, 
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that the allocation of jurisdiction is effective only when the decision 
rendered by the competent court is recognized and enforced by the 
requested State, the exclusive jurisdiction rules also play a 
determinative role at the recognition and enforcement phase.  Hence, 
on the one hand, the requested State can condition the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments on the fact that the court that 
rendered the decision ascertained its jurisdiction on the basis of 
international jurisdiction rules similar to those existing in the requested 
country which establish an exclusive jurisdiction and therefore that 
exclude the court’s competence to address foreign IPRs cases.  In other 
words, the requested court recognizes and enforces the foreign decision 
at stake only if this decision concerns national IPRs of the State that 
enacted the decision, i.e., only if this decision was rendered on the basis 
of exclusive jurisdiction rules similar to the ones existing in the 
requested State.103  On the other hand, the requested State can condition 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments on the fact that 
such an action does not violate its public policy, which in the specific 
case is considered to be integrated by the principle that impedes the 
adjudication of foreign IPRs issues.104  In other words, the requested 
court considers the foreign decision at stake compatible with its public 
policy, and consequently recognizes and enforces it only if this decision 
concerns national IPRs of the State that enacted the decision, i.e., only if 
this decision was rendered on the basis of exclusive jurisdiction rules 
similar to the ones existing in the requested State.  Then, all the 
arguments against exclusive jurisdiction addressed here may be 
reasonably extended to the issues of recognition and enforcement 
themselves, allowing one to conclude that States shall generally 
recognize and enforce foreign decisions even when they address their 
national IPRs issues.  This conclusion is supported not only by all the 
arguments against the exclusive jurisdiction rules, which will be listed 
below, but also by the view that the fundamental human right of access 
to courts is infringed also when the requested State illegally refuses to 
recognize and enforce a foreign judgment rendered by a competent 
court according to its PIL rules.105 
Finally, this Paper adheres to the prevailing opinion that not only 
physical persons but also corporations are entitled to at least certain 
 
subsection 2.3.1-2.  
103.  See Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328 (Eng.).   
104.  See Landova, supra note 102, at 642. 
105. See HELENE GAUDEMET-TALLON, COMPÉTENCE ET EXÉCUTION DES 
JUGEMENTS EN EUROPE 73 (4th ed., 2010); see also infra . 
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fundamental human rights, among which enter the right of access to 
courts and the right to intellectual property.106 
III.  DENIAL OF JUSTICE AND FORUM NECESSITATIS 
A.  Denial of Justice 
To avoid the denial of justice to aliens and to grant them the right of 
access to domestic courts, a general principle of public international law 
developed that requires a State to exercise jurisdiction even where it 
lacks international jurisdiction.107  This same principle also constitutes a 
general principle of European Union law.108 
According to one thesis, States avoid denial of justice simply by 
making their judicial systems available to foreigners.  This thesis is 
inspired by the Calvo Doctrine and has been adopted by many Latin 
American States.  It is formulated, for instance, by the Salvadorian 
Rapporteur, on the topic of State responsibility for the Committee of 
Experts, in the Progressive Codification of International Law, which 
states that 
 
denial of justice is therefore a refusal to grant foreigners 
free access to the Courts instituted in a State for the 
discharge of its judicial functions, or the failure to grant 
free access, in a particular case, to a foreigner who seeks 
to defend his right, although, in the circumstances, 
nationals of the State would be entitled to such access.109 
 
The same opinion was adopted by the Report of the Inter-American 
Juridical Committee in 1961, according to which 
 
106.  See Rainier Arnold, Are Human Rights Universal and Binding? Limits of 
Universalism, (July 2010), THE XVIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON COMPARATIVE 
LAW, (forthcoming). See also recently Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010) recognizing that corporations have free-speech protections.   
107.  See PAULSSON J., DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2005); 
Francesco Francioni, The Right of Access to Justice under Customary International Law, 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 10–11 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007) according to 
whom in international law access to domestic justice starts to be perceived as a right of aliens 
and subsequently develops into a fundamental human right.  On the fundamental human 
right of access to courts see Section V. The Fundamental Human Right of Access to Courts.  
On the general principles of law see Giorgio Gaja, General Principles of Law, in MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press 2008). 
108.  See TRIDIMAS T., THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 370 (2d ed. 2006). 
109.  See the references in Francioni, supra note 107, at 11. 
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the obligation of the State regarding judicial protection 
shall be considered as having been fulfilled when it 
places at the disposal of foreigners the national Courts 
and the legal remedies for implementing their rights.  
The State cannot initiate diplomatic claims for the 
protection of its nationals nor bring an action before an 
international tribunal for this purpose when the means of 
resorting to the competent Court of the respective State 
have been made available.110 
 
According to a second thesis, “access to justice is not simply access 
to the courts, but the availability of a system of fair and impartial justice, 
the effectiveness and legitimacy of which can be reviewed under 
international standards on the treatment of aliens.”111 
This second thesis is more in line with the need to grant foreigners 
effective judicial protection than is the first thesis.  It is codified, for 
instance, in Article 9 of the Harvard Draft on State Responsibility for 
Injuries to Aliens, according to which 
 
denial of justice exists when there is a denial, 
unwarranted delay or obstruction of access to Courts, 
gross deficiency in the administration of judicial or 
remedial process, failure to provide those guarantees 
which are generally considered indispensable to the 
proper administration of justice, or a manifestly unjust 
judgment.  An error of a national court which does not 
produce manifest injustice is not a denial of justice.112 
 
To avoid the denial of justice, a domestic court must exercise its 
jurisdiction over a claim of an alien where two conditions are met: first, 
where the case is linked to the forum State; and second, where no 
efficient alternative forum is available from which the applicant may 
seek redress.  These requirements are also posed by the rule of 
jurisdiction by necessity, which constitutes the subject matter of Part B. 
of this section of this paper, having a scope analogous to that of the 
denial of justice rule, except that it not only concerns aliens but also 
 
110.  See id.  
111.  See id. 
112.  See id. 
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citizens of the forum State.113  Thus, the jurisdiction by necessity rule 
encompasses the denial of justice rule; therefore, the following analysis 
of the former may be extended to the examination of the latter. 
B.  Forum necessitatis 
To avoid denial of justice, not only to aliens but also to citizens, 
general public international law requires States lacking international 
jurisdiction over a case to nonetheless exercise jurisdiction by necessity 
by adopting the doctrine or principle of forum necessitatis.114  Among the 
international norms recognizing forum necessitatis is article two of the 
Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere 
for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments, adopted in La 
Paz in 1984, which states that 
 
[t]he requirements for jurisdiction in the international 
sphere shall also be deemed to be satisfied if, in the 
opinion of the judicial or other adjudicatory authority of 
the State Party in which the judgment is to be given 
effect, the judicial or other adjudicatory authority that 
rendered the judgment assumed jurisdiction in order to 
avoid a denial of justice because of the absence of a 
 
113.  See TOSATO, supra note 93, at 201–202, n.38 (collecting and construing 
resources). 
114.  In certain common law legal systems, the jurisdiction by necessity or the forum 
necessitatis is also referred to as the forum conveniens.  “The institution of the forum 
conveniens for certain aspects follows the same logic grounding the forum necessitatis in the 
civil law countries,” as such Giulia Rossolillo, Forum necessitatis e flessibilità dei criteri di 
giurisdizione nel diritto internazionale privato nazionale e dell’Unione europea,  2 
CUADERNOS DE DERECHO TRANSNACIONAL 406 (2010) available at 
http://kusan.uc3m.es/CIAN/index.php/CDT/issue/view/239.  See also Michaels, supra note 23, 
at 1054.  On the forum necessitatis, see also Simon Othenin-Girard, Quelques observations sur 
le for de nécessité en droit international privé suisse (Article 3 LDIP), in SCWEIZERISCHE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALES UND EUROPÄISCHES RECHT 251 (1999); Lycette 
Corbion, Le déni de justice en droit international privé, PUAM 202 (2004); Arroyo, supra note 
19, at 74; Arnaud Nuyts, Study on Residual Jurisdiction: Review of the Member States’ Rules 
concerning the “Residual Jurisdiction” of their courts in Civil and Commercial Matters 
pursuant to the Brussels I and II Regulations, September 3rd, 2007, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf, at 64; Valentin 
Rétornaz & Bart Volders, Le fort de necessité: tableau comparatif et évolutif, REVUE 
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 227 (2008); Diego P. Fernández Arroyo, Private 
International Law and Comparative Law: A Relationship Challenged by International and 
Supranational Law,  11 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 42 (2009); Jeffery Talpis & Gerald Goldstein, 
The influence of Swiss law on Quebec’s 1994 codification of private international law, 11 Y.B. 
PRIVATE INT’L L. 30 (2009). 
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competent judicial or other adjudicatory authority.115 
 
Among the international soft law norms of an academic origin 
establishing forum necessitatis is Article 24 of the European Group for 
Private International Law “Proposed Amendment of Regulation 
44/2001 in Order to Apply it to External Situations” adopted in Bergen, 
Norway on September 21, 2008, according to which 
 
where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction under 
this Regulation, a person may be sued before the courts 
of a Member State with which the claim has a sufficient 
connection, especially by reason of the presence of 
property in the territory of that State, if the right to a fair 
trial so requires, in particular: / (a) if proceedings in a 
non-Member State are shown to be impossible; or / (b) if 
it could not reasonably be required that the claim should 
be brought before a court of a non-Member State; or / 
(c) if a judgment given on the claim in a non-Member 
State would not be entitled to recognition in the State of 
the court seised under the law of that State and such 
recognition is necessary to ensure that the rights of the 
claimant are satisfied.116 
 
In the European Union, the doctrine of forum necessitatis was 
adopted by a series of rules.  Before examining these EU rules, it is 
relevant to note that the European Union Commission entrusted 
Professor Nuyts of Brussels University to prepare a study on “the 
Member States’ rules concerning residual jurisdiction of their Courts in 
civil and commercial matters pursuant to the Brussels I and II 
Regulations.”117  This study was delivered on September 3, 2007, and 
included a part (Part I.C.16) on forum necessitatis.  So, among the EU 
norms on the forum necessitatis, Article 7 of the Council Regulation on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, and enforcement of decisions 
and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations 
 
115.  Inter-American convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the 
Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments, Article 2, May 24, 1984, available at 
http://www.oas.org/DIL/CIDIP-III-foreignjudgments.htm. 
116.  Proposed Amendment of Regulation 44/2201 in Order to Apply it to External 
Situations, Article 22 bis, Sept. 21, 2008, available at www.gedip-egpil.eu/documents/gedip-
documents-29EN.htm. 
117.  See Nuyts, supra note 114, at 64. 
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[w]here no court of a Member State has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6, the courts of a Member 
State may, on an exceptional basis, hear the case if 
proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or conducted 
or would be impossible in a third State with which the 
dispute is closely connected.  The dispute must have a 
sufficient connection with the Member State of the court 
seised.118 
 
Also, the jurisdiction by necessity rule has been adopted by the 
proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation EC 2201/2003, 
which regulates jurisdiction and applicable law in matrimonial matters.119  
According to Article 7 of this proposal on “residual jurisdiction,” 
 
where none of the spouses is habitually resident in the 
territory of a Member State and do not have a common 
nationality of a Member State, or, in the case of the 
United Kingdom and Ireland do not have their ‘domicile’ 
within the territory of one of the latter Member States, 
the courts of a Member State are competent by virtue of 
the fact that: (a) the spouses had their common previous 
habitual residence in the territory of that Member State 
for at least three years; or (b) one of the spouses has the 
nationality of that Member State, or, in the case of 
United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or her ‘domicile’ in 
the territory of one of the latter Member States.120 
 
118.  Council Regulation (EC) No. 4/2009 of 18 December 2008, Article 7, 2009 O.J. (L 
7/8). 
119.  Commission Staff Working Document, Annex to the proposal for a Council 
Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and introducing 
rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters SEC (2006) 949 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/divorce/docs/sec_2006_949_en.pdf; Commission Staff Eorking 
Document Executive Summary, Impact Assessment for the proposal for a Council Regulation 
amending Regulation (EC) no 2201/2003 as regard jurisdiction and introducing rules 
concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters SEC (2006) 950 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2006:0950:FIN:EN:HTML. 
120.  Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION amending Regulation (EC) No 
2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in 
matrimonial matters, COM (2006) 399 final (July 17, 2006), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/divorce/docs/sec_2006_949_en.pdf.  
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Finally, the forum necessitatis doctrine has also been proposed by the 
Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters.121  According to this proposal, it is 
“appropriate to create additional jurisdiction grounds for disputes 
involving third State defendants,”122 that should find “a balance [] 
between ensuring access to justice on the one hand and international 
courtesy on the other hand,”123 such as the “forum necessitatis, which 
would allow proceedings to be brought when there would otherwise be 
no access to justice”124 by 
 
ensur[ing] that, where no court of a Member State has 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Regulation, the courts of the 
Member States may, on an exceptional basis, hear the 
case if proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or 
conducted or would be impossible in a third State with 
which the dispute is closely connected.125 
 
At the domestic level, forum necessitatis has been adopted by both 
EU and non-EU member States.  Some EU member States have 
adopted forum necessitatis through explicit statutory provisions or case 
law (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom) whereas in the remaining EU Member States 
there are currently neither statutes nor case law concerning forum 
necessitatis.126  However, according to professor Nuyts’ study on the 
Member States’ residual jurisdiction, 
 
that does not mean that the principle of forum 
necessitatis would necessarily be rejected by the court 
should a relevant case arise.  Some national reporters 
expressly note that while there is currently no practice in 
 
121. Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM 
(2009) 175 final available at www.europa.eu.  
122.  Id. at 3. 
123.  Id. at 3. 
124.  Id. at n. 4.  
125.  COM(2009) 175 final, [2]. 
126.  Id. 
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their country, it could theoretically not be accepted, 
under general principle of law, that a party be deprived 
of the right of access to a court if this is necessary to 
vindicate his rights.127 
 
Non EU member States adopting forum necessitatis include: 
Argentina, Canada (including Quebec), Costa Rica, Japan, Mexico, 
Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, and Turkey.128  Furthermore, even in 
the U.S. forum necessitatis has “occasionally been used to rationalize 
courts’ decisions,” having been taken into account by the Supreme 
Court who “has suggested such a basis might be possible.”129  Finally, 
these EU and non-EU countries already exercise jurisdiction by 
necessity, particularly in custody, divorce, succession, and asylum cases, 
but also in commercial matters.130 
In general, the exercise of jurisdiction by necessity is conditioned 
upon two requirements: (1) the case must have some connection to the 
forum State, and (2) it must be unreasonable to bring proceedings 
abroad.  The first requirement, that the case present “some kind of 
connection with the forum,”131 poses a proximity condition132 to avoid 
encumbering a particular jurisdiction with the task of correcting all 
denials of justice happening around the entire world.133  However, this 
requirement does not exist in the systems of the Netherlands or the 
United Kingdom, neither of which impose proximity conditions.134  
Where a proximity condition is required, 
 
there is a general consensus that the required connection 
exists at least when the plaintiff is domiciled or habitually 
resident in the forum State, or even when he is a citizen 
of that State.  But any other contacts with the forum 
State may be relevant, depending on the circumstances, 
such as for instance the presence of assets within the 
jurisdiction.135 
 
127.  Nuyts, supra note 114, at 64. 
128.  See forum necessitatis at supra note 114 (collecting and construing resources).    
129.  See Michaels, supra note 23, at 1054. 
130.  See forum necessitatis at supra note 114.    
131.  Nuyts, supra note 114, at 65. 
132.  See Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 275. 
133.  See Rétornaz & Volders, supra note 114, at 235. 
134.  See Rossolillo, supra note 114, at n.19 (collecting and construing resources). 
135.  See Nuyts, Study, supra note 114, at 66.  See also Rétornaz and Volders, supra 
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The second requirement is that “it is ‘unreasonable,’ 
‘unacceptable . . . there is an ‘unreasonable difficulty’ to bring 
proceedings abroad, or . . . the plaintiff ‘cannot be expected’ to do so.”136  
This second requirement is slightly different than that under EU norms, 
which refer only to the unreasonableness of bringing proceedings before 
the courts of third States, but not to the unreasonableness of bringing 
proceedings before the courts of EU member States.137  However, as will 
be demonstrated in Part D of this Section, this limiting of EU norms to 
proceedings before non-EU member States shall be overridden by way 
of interpretation of those norms, affecting as a result also proceedings 
before EU member States.  The second requirement is met when there 
is a legal obstacle preventing access to the ordinary, competent foreign 
court.  For instance, if that court will not guarantee a fair trial to the 
parties or its decision will not be enforceable in the forum State.  Hence, 
in this latter situation, 
 
if a decision enacted by a EU member State is not 
[recognized] and executed in the requested country, by 
virtue of impeding reasons unrelated to its merits (such 
as a violation of the right of defen[s]e), the party to 
whom the exequatur [sic] has been refused has the right, 
in the absence of another competent Court, to raise his 
action before a Court of the requested State, albeit this 
last Court does not have jurisdiction according to the 
Convention or the Regulations: this last Court can 
ascertain its jurisdiction recalling the denial of justice 
according to its domestic laws.138 
 
note 114, at 235–240. 
136.  See Nuyts, Study, supra note 114, at 65.  
137.  See infra.  
138.  See GAUDEMET-TALLON, supra note 105, at 73, according to whom  
 
si une décision venant d’un État communautaire s’est heurté à un refus de 
reconnaissance et d’exécution dans l’État requis, refus fondé sur des 
motifs étrangers au fond du droit (par exemple, une violation des droits 
de la défense), la partie à qui l’exequatur a été refusé aurait le droit, en 
l’absence d’autre tribunal compétent, de porter son action au fond devant 
un tribunal de l’État requis, pourtant non doté de compétence selon la 
convention ou le règlement: ce dernier pourrait se reconnaître compétent 
sur la base du déni de justice selon le droit commun du for.  
 
UBERTAZZI - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/2011  1:06 PM 
390  MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
This thesis addresses cases either already decided or currently pending 
before the courts of EU member States, and thus, entering into the 
framework of the Brussels system.  However, this thesis’ conclusions 
may be easily extended, mutatis mutandis, to other cases where, from 
the perspective of the forum State, ordinary jurisdiction does not lie 
with it but with a court of another non-EU member State that has 
already rendered a decision; a decision the forum State either does not 
recognize or will not enforce.139  This second requirement of forum 
necessitatis is also met when there is a practical obstacle to effectively 
accessing foreign courts.  For instance, where “the cost of bringing 
proceedings abroad would be ‘out of proportion’ with the financial 
interests involved in the case.”140 
In establishing whether the two requirements of forum necessitatis 
have been met, it is necessary to proceed on a case-by-case basis, and to 
adopt an extensive interpretation of forum necessitatis itself.  Thus, 
forum necessitatis grants the fundamental human right of access to 
courts;141 and therefore, an extensive interpretation of forum necessitatis 
favors this fundamental human right.  Second, with particular regard to 
the first requirement of a connection between the case and the forum 
State, “forum necessitatis supposes the absence of another forum in [the 
forum State, and thus the] connections with [the forum State] will very 
rarely have a strict nature.”142 
The first requirement of forum necessitatis, the existence of a link 
between the case and the forum State, raises the question of whether 
such a link can be considered present if the relevant international 
procedural norms do not support the forum State’s ordinary jurisdiction.  
In other words, since international procedural norms generally allocate 
ordinary jurisdiction to the courts of the forum State only where a link 
exists, could this link be considered as lacking where international 
 
139.  This is precisely what happened in Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth, [2009] 
EWCA (Civ) 1328 (Eng.).  
140.  See Nuyts, supra note 114, at 65. 
141.  See Rétornaz & Volders, supra note 114, at 261.  On the fundamental human 
right of access to courts see infra Section V. The Fundamental Human Right of Access to 
Courts. 
142.  As such Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 276 (collecting and construing 
resources). See also Rétornaz & Volders, supra note 114, at 234, according to whom “il s’agit 
en effet d’évaluer le coût global, et donc pas uniquement monétaire, d’un procès à l’étranger 
par rapport à ce qu’on peut exiger du demandeur”, translation: “it is then necessary to 
evaluate the global costs, and therefore not only the economic ones, of a foreign proceeding 
in relation to what is possible to require from a plaintiff.” 
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jurisdiction rules do not underlie the jurisdiction of the forum State’s 
courts?  For the following reasons the answer to this question must be 
no.  First, jurisdiction by necessity presupposes the absence of ordinary 
international jurisdiction in the forum State; thus, the absence of the 
latter does not preclude its adoption.  Second, “international practice” is 
vast and “shows that . . . the technical argument of lack of jurisdiction 
has not prevented the finding of a denial of justice.”143  Third, this 
conclusion is supported by the argument that the requirements of the 
forum necessitatis should always be interpreted in an extensive way. 
With respect to the second requirement of forum necessitatis, the 
unreasonableness of bringing proceedings abroad, the question arises as 
to whether a duplication of proceedings can be considered unreasonable.  
This question is particularly, but not only, relevant with respect to 
European patent litigation, since Article Vd of the Protocol annexed to 
the Brussels Convention states that 
 
[w]ithout prejudice to the jurisdiction of the European 
Patent Office under the Convention on the grant of 
European Patents, signed at Munich on October 5, 1973, 
the courts of each Contracting State shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction, regardless of domicile, in proceedings 
concerned with the registration or validity of any 
European patent granted for that State144 
 
and since the ECJ rendered the Roche decision and maintained that 
 
Article 6[1] of the Brussels Convention [now Article 6.1 
of the Brussels I Regulation according to which a] 
defendant domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued: 
(1) where he is one of a number of defendants, in the 
courts for the place where any one of them is 
domiciled . . . must be interpreted as meaning that it does 
not apply in European patent infringement proceedings 
involving a number of companies established in various 
Contracting States in respect of acts committed in one or 
more of those States even where those companies, which 
belong to the same group, may have acted in an identical 
or similar manner in accordance with a common policy 
 
143.  Francioni, supra note 107, at 12. 
144.  Protocol annexed to the Brussels Convention, Article 5d, 27 Sept. 1968. 
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elaborated by one of them.145 
 
Since neither the patent infringements of which the various defendants 
are accused nor the national law in relation to which those acts are 
assessed are the same, there is no risk of irreconcilable decisions being 
given in European patent infringement proceedings brought in different 
contracting States because possible divergences between decisions given 
by the courts concerned would not arise in the context of the same 
factual and legal situation.  Under this framework, the ECJ will have an 
opportunity to limit the interpretation of the Roche decision.  Hence, on 
September 15, 2010, the District Court of The Hague referred to the 
ECJ questions concerning the correct interpretation of irreconcilable 
decisions in the context of Article 6.1 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
Thus, according to the District Court of The Hague, the ECJ Roche 
decision was not applicable in the case at hand, as it 
 
concerned a case where the various defendants were 
accused only of infringing a patent in the respective 
countries where they were situated (so defendant A in 
country A; defendant B in country B; etc.), whereas in 
the current case, the various defendants were each 
accused of infringing a patent in all of the respective 
countries that are mentioned in Solvay’s claim for a 
cross-border injunction (so defendant A both in country 
A and in country B; defendant B both in country A and 
in country B; etc.).146 
 
According to the District Court of The Hague, “in such an event Article 
6(1) [Brussels I Regulation] would be applicable as there would be a 
risk of ‘irreconcilable decisions.’”147 
Furthermore, the Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 44/2001 recognizes the need to amend the Regulation in the 
sense of allowing a consolidation of proceedings with respect to the 
European patents infringements perpetrated by companies belonging to 
 
145.  Case C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R. I-6535, ¶¶ 5, 41.  On 
this decision see the doctrine supra note 7. 
146.  NL-Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe B.V., District Court of 
The Hague, The Netherlands, 15 September 2010, Case No. 09-2275. 
147.  Id.  
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the same group.148  The eventual future restrictive interpretation of the 
Roche decision, and the eventual future amendment of the Brussels 
Regulation on that point, would not change the need to answer the 
question posed here as to whether the duplication of proceedings in 
relation to IPRs cases can be considered unreasonable.  Hence, the 
notion of duplication of proceedings adopted here does not concern 
European patents alone, but extends to all other IPRs, it being, mutatis 
mutandis, the same as the notion referred to by a recent study 
undertaken by Prof. Diemar Harhoff of the University of Munich for 
the European Union Commission, delivered on February 26, 2009, and 
entitled Economic-Cost Benefit Analysis of a Unified and Integrated 
European Patent Litigation System.149  According to this study, 
 
duplication as referred to in this report does not require 
that exactly the same legal matter be brought by identical 
parties into different national courts.  For the purpose of 
the [study,] we can speak of duplicated cases if the 
introduction of a unified Court would render one or 
several of the cases unnecessary, i.e. if the different 
national cases are substitutes in a legal and economic 
sense.150 
 
With this clarification in mind, the answer to the current question as 
to whether a duplication of proceedings can be considered unreasonable 
should be yes, for the following reasons.  First, the conclusion that 
duplication of proceedings can be considered unreasonable is supported 
by the argument that the requirements of forum necessitatis should 
always be interpreted in an extensive way.  Second, this conclusion is 
also supported by the fact that duplication increases litigation costs (and 
also may lead to divergent outcomes), rendering them out of proportion 
 
148.  Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, at 6, COM (2009) 175 final, available at www.europa.eu.  
149.  Dietmar Harhoff, Economic Cost-Benefit Anaysis of a Unified and Integrated 
European Patent Litigation System, Institute for Innovation Research, Technology 
Management and Entrepreneurship, Feb. 29, 2009, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/studies/litigation_system_en.pdf.  
On this study see Thomas Jaeger, Reto Hilty, Josef Drexl & H. Ullrich, Comments of the Max 
Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law on the 2009 Commission 
Proposal for the Establishment of a Unified Patent Judiciary, 40 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. 
& COMPETITION L. 818 (2009). 
150.  Harhoff, supra note 149, at n. 19. 
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with the financial interests involved in the case.  As already seen, this 
circumstance constitutes a practical obstacle to bringing proceedings 
abroad, which renders it unreasonable to do so.  Third, this conclusion is 
confirmed by a recent series of Swiss decisions concerning the 
administration of immovable estates located in more than one State, 
including the forum State. 
In a 1990 decision, the Zurich Obergericht exercised jurisdiction by 
necessity over the succession of a U.K. citizen last domiciled in Italy, in 
relation to various estates located in different States, including 
Switzerland and Luxembourg.151  In that case, the plaintiff asked the 
Zurich Court of First Instance to adjudicate the succession of the Swiss 
and Luxembourg estates.  The requested court declined its competence 
on the grounds that Swiss international procedural law conferred only 
international jurisdiction to the Swiss Courts in succession matters 
where the de cuius was last domiciled in Switzerland, whereas in the 
case before the court the de cuius was last domiciled in Italy.  However, 
the Zurich Court of Second Instance reversed the decision, on the 
grounds that the courts that would have ordinarily been competent to 
hear the case could not have addressed it in its entirety.  That is, the 
courts of the State where the de cuius was last domiciled, Italy, were not 
competent to address the succession issues related to the estates located 
abroad, while, analogously, the courts of the State of the de cuius’ 
nationality, the U.K. Courts, were not competent to adjudicate the 
matters related to the “foreign” estates, and the courts of the State 
where the estates were located, i.e., Luxembourg, were competent to 
address only the issues related to their local estates.  Thus, the Zurich 
Court of Second Instance concluded that requiring the plaintiff to raise 
proceedings in the United Kingdom, Italian, Luxembourg, and Swiss 
Courts would have been unreasonable, and established its jurisdiction 
by necessity over the succession of both the Swiss and Luxembourg 
estates. 
This same result was reached in a subsequent case also rendered by 
the Zurich Obergericht in 1992.152  The plaintiffs in that case asked the 
Swiss Court of First Instance to adjudicate the succession of an Iraqi 
citizen last domiciled in London, with regard to various estates located 
in Switzerland and Liechtenstein.  The requested court declined its 
 
151.  See Obergericht ZH, Feb. 2, 1990, ZR 89 (1990), n. 4, p.7 (Swi.).  On this decision 
see Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 283. 
152.  See Obergericht ZH, Feb. 26, 1992, ZR 90 (1991), n. 89, p.289 (Swi.). On this 
decision see Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 284. 
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competence on the grounds that the de cuius was last domiciled in 
London not in Switzerland.  However, the Zurich Court of Second 
Instance reversed the decision, finding that, firstly, it was unnecessary to 
establish the international jurisdiction of the Iraqi Courts since the de 
cuius was a refugee in the United Kingdom, and, according to the Swiss 
international jurisdiction rules (Article 24.3), where these rules refer to 
citizenship, in cases of refugees they shall be interpreted as designating 
the domicile.  Secondly, the U.K. Courts ordinarily competent to hear 
the case could not have addressed it in its entirety, since they could not 
have adjudicated the issues related to the estates in Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein.  Thus, the Zurich Court of Second Instance concluded 
that requiring the plaintiff to raise proceedings before both the U.K. 
and Swiss Courts would have been unreasonable, and thereby 
established its jurisdiction by necessity over the succession of both the 
Swiss estates and those located abroad. 
In sum, both of the preceding disputes were such that the courts of 
no single State had the ordinary jurisdiction to address them in their 
entirety, thereby requiring the plaintiff to otherwise start several “local” 
proceedings before the courts of each State where the estates were 
located.  In such a context, the courts of the forum State considered the 
bringing of so many proceedings before so many different courts to be 
unreasonable, and thereby determined that the duplication of 
proceedings met the second requirement of forum necessitatis.153  It 
should also be noted that these adjudications also met the first 
requirement of the doctrine of forum necessitatis, in that the cases were 
linked to the forum State at least by the presence of estates in 
Switzerland. 
C.  Sources of Law Hierarchy 
Another question that arises is whether the international, EU, and 
domestic rules on forum necessitatis are expressions of or constitute a 
general principle of law.154  This question should be answered in the 
affirmative for at least the following reasons.  First, since the avoidance 
of the denial of justice is a general principle of law, and forum 
necessitatis aims at avoiding the denial of justice, the former should have 
the same legal nature as the latter.  Moreover, although forum 
necessitatis extends the scope of the rule of avoidance of the denial of 
justice, in that it concerns not only aliens but citizens alike, this 
 
153.  See Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 283–284. 
154.  See Gaja, supra note 107.  
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difference does not change the conclusion just reached.  Forum 
necessitatis avoids not only the denial of justice, but also discrimination 
between citizens and aliens in the exercise of the right of access to 
courts, and the avoidance of discrimination and the right of access to 
courts are fundamental human rights and, as such, constitute general 
principles of law.  It thereby follows that forum necessitatis should have 
the same juridical nature as these general principles of law. 
Second, the conclusion that forum necessitatis constitutes a general 
principle of law is supported by the fact that the international, EU, and 
municipal rules establishing it generally take the same approach to this 
notion, creating a genuine common denominator, namely the two 
requirements of proximity to the forum State and the unreasonableness 
of litigating before the ordinary competent court.  Since the existence of 
a genuine common denominator among rules is one possible criterion 
for the construction of a general principle of law,155 it is reasonable to 
conclude that forum necessitatis constitutes a general principle of law. 
Third, this conclusion is not deniable just because two of the 
municipal rules concerning forum necessitatis permit its adoption 
without imposing a proximity requirement, or because EU norms limit 
its adoption to cases where the ordinary competent court is in a non-EU 
member State.  The two municipal rules that do not establish a 
proximity requirement do increase the scope of the forum necessitatis, 
but do so without compromising the genuine common denominator 
between all the other rules, which are more rigorous in that they impose 
the proximity condition.  The same can be said with regard to the EU 
norms that limit the adoption of forum necessitatis to cases where the 
ordinary competent court is in a non-EU member State.  While it is true 
that the EU rules limit rather than increase the scope of forum 
necessitates, this limitation does not compromise the genuine common 
denominator between all the other rules, which are more liberal in that 
they do not distinguish between the EU external or internal location of 
the ordinary competent court.  Moreover, as will be demonstrated later 
in this section, although the EU norms explicitly refer to cases where 
the ordinary competent court is of a non-EU member State, they should 
be interpreted as also allowing the exercise of jurisdiction by necessity 
when the ordinary competent court is in an EU member country. 
Fourth, this conclusion is supported by the Nuyts’ study 
commissioned by the EU, according to which forum necessitatis is a 
 
155.  Id. at 30. 
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“general principle of public international law.”156 
The characterization of forum necessitatis as a general principle of 
law leads to the following conclusions.  From a primary law157 
coordination of norms and hierarchical perspective,158 forum necessitatis 
has direct effect in the EU and in the internal legal systems, and prevails 
over domestic rules, EU secondary norms, and international 
conventions.  This is because 
 
[o]ne cannot assume that treaty rules always prevail over 
general principles of law. This would normally be the 
case when the treaty and the general principle cover the 
same ground. However, a general principle could also 
affect the way in which a certain treaty rule is to be 
applied. It could impinge on the application of the treaty 
rule under limited aspects. In that case it would be more 
appropriate to say that the principle prevails.159 
 
Therefore, the municipal norms that do not contemplate forum 
necessitatis should be interpreted by the domestic courts as not impeding 
its adoption.160  Accordingly, the European Union provisions that do not 
contemplate or that exclude forum necessitatis should either be 
interpreted by the domestic courts of the EU member States as not 
impeding the adoption thereof, or simply should not be applied by those 
domestic courts, or should be declared partially invalid by the ECJ on 
 
156.  See Nuyts, supra note 114, at 64.  See also Rétornaz & Volders, supra note 114, at 
229, according to whom “le for de nécessité découle d’un principe général interdisant les 
dénis de justice.”  Translation: “the jurisdiction by necessity forum arises out of a general 
principle that imposes to avoid the denial of justice.”  
157.  With the term primary law, this Section refers to Part I of the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26. U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/2001 [hereinafter Draft Articles], available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf, on “[t]he 
internationally wrongful act of a State [that] deals with the requirements for the international 
responsibility of a State to arise.”  Id. at 32.  
158.  For a comparative perspective on the “hierarchy” of the sources of international 
law in the different national legal systems involved: Argentina, Austria, Australia, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Serbia, 
Slovakia, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela, see Dinah Shelton, 
International Law in Domestic Systems (July 2010) in THE XVIIITH INTERNATIONAL 
CONGRESS ON COMPARATIVE LAW, § 10 (forthcoming).   
159.  See generally Gaja, supra note 107, at 22. 
160.  Id. 
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grounds of ”infringement of the [EU] Treaties or of any rule of law 
relating to their application[,]”161 as they are general principles of law or, 
depending on the circumstances of the case, through a proceeding to 
review the legality of the norms under Article 263 of the Lisbon Treaty 
or through a preliminary ruling under Article 267.162 
Finally, the international treaties that do not contemplate or exclude 
forum necessitatis should either be interpreted by the domestic courts of 
the party States as indeed allowing the doctrine’s adoption or should not 
be applied where they exclude forum necessitatis.  It is true that 
inconsistency with a general principle of law does not generally 
invalidate a treaty;163 however, since forum necessitatis is a general 
principle of law, it can be considered by a domestic court as prevailing 
over the implied treaty rule, and thus impinging on the application of 
the treaty rule, thereby allowing access to the court. 
D.  EU Brussels System 
Another question that arises is whether forum necessitatis also 
applies to cases falling within the scope of international conventions or 
EU norms that establish international jurisdiction rules, but do so 
without explicitly including a jurisdiction by necessity provision.  The 
Brussels System, in particular, will be examined below.  In answering 
this question, it is relevant to examine the ECJ’s Owusu decision.164  
While this decision addresses forum non conveniens,165 rather than 
forum necessitatis, according to one thesis,166 it applies also with respect 
to the latter.  In the Owusu case, the plaintiff, a British national 
domiciled in the United Kingdom, suffered an accident while on 
vacation in Jamaica and subsequently brought in the United Kingdom 
both an action for breach of contract against the person, as the 
individual that rented him the villa in Jamaica where the accident 
occurred was also domiciled in the United Kingdom, and an action in 
tort against several Jamaican companies responsible for the villa’s 
 
161.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(Lisbon Treaty), art. 263 (ex art. 230 TEC), Mar. 25, 1957. 
162.  Id. at Article 267 (ex Article 234 TEC).  
163.  Save where the general principle of law expresses a jus cogens rule, see Treaties 
conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (“jus cogens”), of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of treaties, art. 53, done at Vienna May 23, 1969,  entered into force 
on Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 United Nations, Treaty Series, 331.   
164.  Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383.  
165.  On the forum non conveniens notion see Section 4, Part D, EU Brussels System. 
166.  See Rossolillo, supra note 114, at 412. 
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management, upkeep and control.167  The defendants argued that the 
courts best positioned to hear the case were the Jamaican Courts, as 
opposed to the U.K. Courts.168  Accordingly, the defendants asked the 
U.K. Court to decline its jurisdiction in the name of forum non 
conveniens.169  In the United Kingdom, this doctrine establishes that 
 
a national Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction on 
the ground that a court in another State, which also has 
jurisdiction, would objectively be a more appropriate 
forum for the trial of the action, that is to say, a forum in 
which the case may be tried more suitably for the 
interests of all the parties and the ends of justice.170 
 
In response to the motion and prayer request, the U.K. Court 
referred an interlocutory question to the ECJ asking it to establish 
whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens (hereinafter the forum 
non conveniens) could be applied within the framework of the Brussels 
Convention, since the convention did not explicitly make reference to 
it.171  The ECJ answered that the doctrine could not apply, citing the 
following arguments.172  First, based on a literal interpretation of the 
Brussels Convention, the convention does not allow any derogation 
from the principles it lays down.173  Second, the ECJ argument relied on 
a historical interpretation of the Brussels Convention, according to 
which 
 
[i]t is common ground that no exception on the basis of 
the forum non conveniens doctrine was provided for by 
the authors of the Convention, although the question was 
 
167.  Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383, ¶¶ 10–12. 
168.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
169.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
170.  Id at ¶ 8 (citing Spiliada Mar. Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1986] A.C. 460 (H.L.) 476.)  
On the relationship between the forum non conveniens and the Brussels Convention before 
the ECJ Owusu decision see Gardella & Brozolo, supra note 23, at 620; and after the Owusu 
decision see Barry J. Rodger, Forum non conveniens post-Owusu, 2 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 71 
(2006).  See also the resolution of the Institut de Droit International, The principles for 
determining when the use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens and anti-suit injunctions is 
appropriate, Rapporteur Sir Lawrence Collins, Session de Bruges (Feb. 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2003_bru_01_en.PDF. 
171.  See id. 
172.  See id.  
173.  Id. at ¶ 37. 
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discussed when the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the 
Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
was drawn up, as is apparent from the report on that 
Convention by Professor Schlosser.174 
 
Third, the ECJ argument was based on a teleological interpretation of 
the Brussels Convention, which stated that while 
 
[r]espect for the principle of legal certainty, which is one 
of the objectives of the Brussels Convention (see inter 
alia, Case C-440/97 GIE Groupe Concorde and Others 
[1999] ECR I-6307, paragraph 23, and Case C-256/00 
Besix [2002] ECR I-1699, paragraph 24), would not be 
fully guaranteed if the court having jurisdiction under the 




allowing forum non conveniens in the context of the 
Brussels Convention would be likely to affect the 
uniform application of the rules of jurisdiction contained 
therein in so far as that doctrine is recogni[z]ed only in a 
limited number of Contracting States, whereas the 
objective of the Brussels Convention is precisely to lay 
down common rules to the exclusion of derogating 
national rules.176 
 
Fourth, the ECJ argument based on an ab inconvenienti interpretation 
of the Convention was that forum non conveniens would undermine the 
“legal protection of persons established in the Community . . . .”177  
Hence, the ECJ concluded that 
 
 
174.   Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383 ¶ 37 (referencing 
Peter Schlosser, REPORT ON THE CONVENTION on the Association of the Kingdom of 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice, 1979 O.J. C 59, 71 ¶¶ 77–78). 
175.  Id. at ¶ 38. 
176.  Id. at ¶ 43.  
177.  Id. at ¶ 42. 
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[f]irst, a defendant, who is generally better placed to 
conduct his defen[s]e before the courts of his domicile, 
would not be able . . . reasonably to foresee before which 
other court he may be sued.  Second, where a plea is 
raised on the basis that a foreign court is a more 
appropriate forum to try the action, it is for the claimant 
to establish that he will not be able to obtain justice 
before that foreign court or, if the court sei[z]ed decides 
to allow the plea, that the foreign court has in fact no 
jurisdiction to try the action or that the claimant does 
not, in practice, have access to effective justice before 
that court, irrespective of the cost entailed by the 
bringing of a fresh action before a court of another State 
and the prolongation of the procedural time-limits.178 
 
It is therefore important to establish whether the arguments 
grounding the Owusu decision may be extended from the context of 
forum non conveniens to that of forum necessitatis.  To this end, a first 
thesis has determined that there are four possible groups of cases, of 
which the Owusu decision does not apply to three of them such that 
forum necessitatis can thus be adopted in those three groups of cases.179  
In the first group of cases established by this thesis, international 
jurisdiction is allocated under the Brussels System to the courts of a 
non-member State.  In those cases, this thesis determines that the 
Owusu decision does not preclude the member States’ courts from 
applying forum necessitatis.  On one hand, this conclusion is based on 
the “unilateral perspective” of the Brussels System, which privileges the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of member States over the courts of 
non-member States.  On the other hand,  the conclusion is based on the 
differences between forum non conveniens and forum necessitatis.  The 
latter provides the forum court with jurisdiction that would otherwise 
not exist, whereas the former deprives the forum court of jurisdiction 
that otherwise does exist.  Thus, forum non conveniens can lead to the 
denial of justice, whereas forum necessitatis, by its nature, avoids such a 
denial.  In addition, the Owusu decision was aimed at safeguarding the 
“legal protection of the persons established in the [territory]” covered 
by the Brussels System.180  Therefore, transferring proceedings, by virtue 
 
178.  Id. at ¶ 42. 
179.  See Rossolillo, supra note 114, at 417. 
180.  Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383 ¶ 2. 
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of forum non conveniens, to the courts of a non-member State would 
deprive the persons established in the territory, and thereby covered by 
the Brussels System, of its procedural and substantive standard of 
protection and of its regime of free circulation of decisions.  In contrast, 
however, forum necessitatis implies the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
forum court of a member State, and is therefore in line with the system 
and standards established by the Brussels System to safeguard those 
aforementioned procedural and substantive rights. 
In the second group of cases delineated by this thesis, under the 
Brussels System, international jurisdiction is allocated to the courts of 
an EU member State other than that of the forum, but the courts of the 
forum State are permitted to exercise jurisdiction by necessity either 
because the other member State’s decision will be unenforceable in the 
forum State’s courts for reasons of public policy, or because fortuitous 
or force majeure circumstances, such as a war or an earthquake, impede 
the plaintiff from bringing the proceedings before the ordinarily 
competent court.  According to this thesis, in such cases the exercise of 
jurisdiction by necessity does not imply an evaluation of the legal system 
of the State with ordinary jurisdiction.  Thus, the Owusu decision does 
not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by necessity.  This conclusion is 
based, mutatis mutandis, on the reasons set forth with respect to the first 
group of cases examined. 
In the third group of cases established by this thesis, international 
jurisdiction is allocated under the Brussels System to the courts of a 
member State, but the forum State is permitted to exercise its 
jurisdiction by necessity due to the need to grant the plaintiff certain 
rights not recognized by the legal system of the State with ordinary 
competence, such as the right to contract a same-sex marriage. Here, the 
exercise of jurisdiction by necessity implies an evaluation of the legal 
system of another member State.  Yet, in these cases, this thesis holds 
that the Owusu decision does not preclude such jurisdiction.  On the 
one hand, this conclusion is based on the need to safeguard the rights in 
question, such as the right to contract a same-sex marriage.  On the 
other hand, this conclusion is based, mutatis mutandis, on the reasons set 
forth with respect to the first group of cases examined. 
Finally, in the fourth group of cases established by this thesis, 
international jurisdiction is allocated under the Brussels System to the 
courts of a member State, but the exercise of jurisdiction by necessity is 
not permitted since it is grounded on reasons such as excessive time or 
cost of proceeding before the “ordinary” competent court.  In those 
cases, this thesis holds that such an exercise of jurisdiction implies an 
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evaluation of the legal system of the State with ordinary jurisdiction.  
The thesis thereby holds that in those cases the Owusu decision 
precludes the exercise of jurisdiction by necessity.  This conclusion is 
grounded not on the differences but rather on the similarities between 
the forum non conveniens and the forum necessitatis, namely, that they 
both provide domestic courts with great discretionary power to establish 
on a case-by-case basis whether it is appropriate to exercise jurisdiction, 
and that excluding the adoption of forum non conveniens and forum 
necessitatis only when the ordinary competent court is located in a EU 
member State implies an obligation of mutual trust between member 
States, which is the concept that lay at the base of the Brussels System.181 
The conclusions of this first thesis are convincing in relation to the 
first three groups of cases proposed by it, specifically the groups of cases 
that exclude the application of the ECJ Owusu decision to forum 
necessitatis.  However, it seems to me that the arguments on which this 
thesis grounds its conclusions are not convincing.  Also, other reasons 
exist on the basis of which one may conclude that forum necessitatis is 
always applicable no matter the peculiarities of the case involved, such 
that the distinction among the different groups of cases is unnecessary. 
The arguments raised by this thesis are unconvincing for the 
following three reasons.  First, on the one hand, this thesis does not 
permit the adoption of forum necessitatis when, as in the fourth group of 
cases, ordinary jurisdiction belongs to another member State and the 
forum’s exercise of jurisdiction would imply an evaluation of the other 
State’s system.  Yet, on the other hand, when as with the third group of 
cases, institutions are involved that are unknown to the State with 
ordinary jurisdiction, such as same-sex marriage, this thesis allows the 
forum State to exercise jurisdiction by necessity notwithstanding the fact 
that ordinary jurisdiction belongs to another member State, and that 
such an exercise of jurisdiction implies an evaluation of the other State’s 
legal system.  Furthermore, this thesis justifies disparate treatment on 
the grounds that only the latter cases implicate rights deserving special 
protection.  Here, the weakness of this thesis’ logic lies in its failure to 
recognize that both the former and the latter cases relate to the right of 
access to courts, which as a fundamental human right also deserves 
special protection. 
 
181.  See Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski, 2000 E.C.R. I-1935; Case C-116/02, 
Gasser v. MISAT, 2003 E.C.R. I-14693, on both of which in relation to the obligation of 
mutual trust, see Rossolillo, supra note 114, at 417; Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Choice of 
Court and Arbitration Agreements and the Review of the Brussels I Regulation, 30 PRAXIS DES 
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENS-RECHTS [IPRAX] 121 (2010).    
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Second, this thesis contradicts itself.  It allows the exercise of 
jurisdiction by necessity when, as in the second group of cases, the 
decision of the court of ordinary competence would be contrary to the 
public policy of, and thus unenforceable in, the forum State, while at the 
same time, it proscribes such jurisdiction when, as in the fourth group of 
cases, bringing a proceeding before the court of ordinary competence 
would entail excessive time or cost.  However, since the excessive time 
or cost of a proceeding renders a judgment contrary to Article 6 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature by the member States of 
the Council of Europe in Rome on November 4, 1950 (ECHR) and 
thus, contrary to the public policy of the forum member State, it is 
therefore also unenforceable in the forum State. 
Third, this thesis first emphasizes the differences between forum 
necessitatis and forum non conveniens, then suggests an application to 
the former of the Owusu decision related to the latter, then 
subsequently highlights the similarities between forum non conveniens 
and forum necessitatis, and then finally suggests an application to the 
latter of the Owusu decision related to the former.  Thus, this thesis is 
not linear, as well as being excessively complicated. 
In contrast, the thesis proposed here maintains that forum 
necessitatis can always be adopted, even within the framework of 
international conventions that do not explicitly mention it, for the 
following eight reasons.  First, a coordination of the norms and 
hierarchical interpretation of the Brussels System and forum necessitiatis 
highlights that the latter constitutes a general principle of law and as 
such prevails over the Brussels System.  Second, a literal interpretation 
of the Brussels System indicates that it does not explicitly impede 
application of forum necessitatis.  Third, a teleological and systematic 
interpretation of the Brussels System and the norms concerning 
fundamental human rights indicates that, since the fundamental human 
right of access to courts is at the basis of the forum necessitatis, the 
Brussels System must be interpreted as operating in a sense favorable 
to, and as ultimately adopting, forum necessitatis.  Fourth, a teleological 
and systematic interpretation of the Brussels System and the norms of 
fundamental human rights also highlights that the obligation of mutual 
trust and the need for legal certainty cannot prevail over the 
fundamental human right of access to courts.  This conclusion is in line 
with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), according to which member States of the ECHR violate its 
Article 6 provision even when they limit the applicant’s right of access 
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to courts to give effect to the rules of an international agreement,182 such 
as the Brussels and Lugano Conventions.  Furthermore, as will be 
demonstrated by the following remarks, the same conclusions apply 
with respect to EU norms such as the Brussels I Regulation, despite the 
peculiarities of the relation between the ECHR and the European 
Union.  Fifth, a teleological interpretation of the Brussels System 
emphasizes that even in the presence of such a system 
 
the risk of a negative conflict of competence is never 
totally inexistent; it is never possible to exclude that the 
sei[z]ing of the Courts of a member State which is 
exclusively competent with respect to the [Brussel 
System] happens to be impossible for the plaintiff, and 
therefore that he suffers a denial of justice.183 
 
Indeed, the Brussels System “aims at improving the condition of the 
persons involved and not at depriving them of an accessible Court when 
they suffer a denial of justice by reason of a malfunction of a mechanism 
instituted by an international instrument.”184  Thus, the existence of the 
Brussels System cannot preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by 
necessity.  Sixth, a historical interpretation of the Brussels System 
demonstrates that, during its adoption, no discussion with respect to 
forum necessitatis occurred.  Thus, no argument precluding the exercise 
of jurisdiction by necessity can be derived from its legislative history.  
Seventh, the thesis proposed here is supported by current States’ 
practice, which already applied forum necessitatis to cases falling within 
the scope of the Brussels System, even when ordinary jurisdiction 
belonged to the courts of another member State.  Eighth, the thesis 
proffered here is not contradicted by the ECJ Owusu decision.  Hence, 
this decision does not explicitly concern the forum necessitatis.  
Additionally, as already mentioned, forum non conveniens deprives a 
forum court of jurisdiction that otherwise exists, as such bringing 
 
182.  See infra.  
183.  See Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 266, “le risque d’un conflit négatif de 
compétence n’est jamais totalement inexistant; on ne peut jamais exclure que la saisine des 
juridictions d’un Etat contractant exclusivement compétent au regard de la convention se 
révèle impossible pour le demandeur, et que celui-ci subisse un déni de justice.”  See also 
GAUDEMET-TALLON, supra note 105, at 73. 
184.  See Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 267, “pour fonction d’améliorer le sort des 
justiciables et non de les priver d’un for lorsqu’elles subissent un déni de justice en raison du 
mauvais fonctionnement des mécanismes instaurés par l’instrument international.”  
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jurisdiction outside the European Union, whereas forum necessitatis 
provides the EU Courts with jurisdiction that would otherwise not exist 
and, therefore, is in line with the need to safeguard the “legal protection 
of the persons established in the [territory]”185 covered by the Brussels 
System.  Then, unlike forum non conveniens, the legislative history of 
the Brussels Convention does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction 
by necessity.  Finally, mutatis mutandis, the aforementioned reasons 
lead to the conclusion that while the aforementioned EU norms 
explicitly contemplate forum necessitatis only with respect to cases 
belonging to the ordinary jurisdiction of non-EU member States, 
jurisdiction by necessity can still be exercised in relation to cases 
pertaining to the ordinary jurisdiction of EU member countries. 
E.  Exclusive Jurisdiction in the Brussels System 
Another question arises as to whether forum necessitatis also applies 
to cases falling within the Brussels System’s exclusive jurisdiction 
provisions. The answer to this question should be in the affirmative, for 
the following reasons. 
The first recalls all the reasons in favor of the adoption of forum 
necessitatis within the framework of the Brussels System, which reasons, 
mutatis mutandis, apply even when ordinary jurisdiction belongs 
exclusively to a court outside of the forum State. 
The second argument recognizes that exclusive jurisdiction 
provisions can easily lead to the denial of justice, and consequently 
emphasizes that their presence further obliges the adoption of forum 
necessitatis.  For example, bringing a case before the courts of a member 
State that, according to the Brussels System are exclusively competent 
with respect to this case, may be impossible for the plaintiff, with the 
consequence that if no other forum has jurisdiction to examine the case, 
the plaintiff suffers a denial of justice.186 
The third argument emphasizes that, save the just cited thesis, which 
maintains that exclusive jurisdiction provisions render the adoption of 
forum necessitatis all the more necessary, none of the other studies that I 
examined address differently the exclusive jurisdiction provisions from 
all other international jurisdiction norms as far as forum necessitatis is 
concerned.  Thus, the conclusions reached with respect to the latter, to 
the effect that forum necessitatis must be adopted even within the 
framework of the Brussels System, should also apply with respect to the 
 
185.  Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383 ¶ 2. 
186.  See Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 266. 
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former, thereby establishing that jurisdiction by necessity must be 
exercised within the framework of the Brussels System even in cases 
falling within their exclusive jurisdiction provisions. 
The fourth argument is based on the thesis proposed here, which 
asserts that exclusive jurisdiction provisions are contrary to public 
international law; as such, they are thereby illegal and should be 
overruled from a de lege ferenda perspective, whereas from a de lege lata 
perspective these rules cannot derogate from or prevail over the rule of 
forum necessitatis. 
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS 
A.  Right of Access to Courts 
Public international law grants, to both aliens and citizens alike, the 
fundamental human right of access to courts.187  Among the universal 
international norms regarding the right of access to court are: Article 8 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on December 
10, 1948, by the General Assembly of the United Nations and Article 
2.3 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by the same General Assembly on December 16, 1966.188  Among the 
regional international norms regarding the right of access to courts are: 
Article 6.1 of the ECHR and Article 8 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, adopted at San José, Costa Rica on November 22, 
1969.189 
With respect to the European Union, the right of access to courts is 
granted by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, adopted at Nice on December 7, 2000 (Charter of 
Nice), which is referenced by Article 6.1 of the Treaty of Lisbon 
 
187.  On the impact of the fundamental human right of access to a court (due process) 
on the issue of international jurisdiction, see MATSCHER F., IPR und IZVR vor den Organen 
der EMRK – Eine Skizze, in BARFUSS W., DUTOIT B., FORKEL H., IMMENGA U. and 
MAJOROS F. (eds.), Festschrift für Karl H. Neumayer zum 65. Geburtstag 459 (Nomos, 
Baden-Baden, 1985);  PETER SCHLOSSER, Jurisdiction in International Litigation—The Issue 
of Human Rights in Relation to National Law and to the Brussels Convention, LXXIV 
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 5 (1991); Guinchard E., Procès equitable (article 6 
CESDH) et droit international privé, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE AND 
RELATIONS WITH THIRD STATES 199, n. 22 (NUYTS A. & WATTÉ N. eds., 2005); James 
Fawcett, The Impact of Article 6(1) of the ECHR on Private International Law, 56 INT’L 
COMP. L.Q. 1, nn. 6, 36 (2007); FABIEN MARCHADIER, LES OBJECTIFS GÉNÉRAUX DU 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ À L’ÉPREUVE DE LA CONVENTION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 
37 (Bruylant ed. 2007).  See also the doctrine referred to at note 18. 
188.  See for all Francioni, note 107, at 24. 
189.  Id.  
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amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007.190  
According to that treaty, “[t]he Union recognizes the rights, freedoms 
and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 
December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties.”191  Furthermore, Article 6.3 of the same Treaty states that 
“[f]undamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.”192  Finally, 
according to Article 6.2 of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union 
“the Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection 
of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”193 
The fundamental right of access to courts is domestically established 
by several EU member States, namely, Austria, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands.194  This right is also domestically 
established by several non-EU member States, namely, Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, 
Switzerland, and Turkey.195  Furthermore, although “U.S. law does not 
endorse an explicit general right of access to court[s],”196 such a right 
constitutes the “European equivalent of the American constitutional 
guarantee of due process,”197 and can be found “indirectly in two other 
doctrines,”198 namely, jurisdiction by necessity and the duty of courts to 
exercise the jurisdiction they have been given by the legislature. 
The proceeding remarks relate, in particular, to the fundamental 
human right of access to courts as established by Article 6 of the ECHR 
and as interpreted by the ECtHR inter alia because of its place within 
 
190.  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, 2007 O.J. C 
306/01. 
191.  Id.  
192.  Id. 
193.  Id.  See Protocol relating to Article 6(2) on the Treaty on the European Union on 
the accession of the Union to the European Convention from the Protection of the Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2007 O.J. C 306/01, at 155. 
194.  See http://confinder.richmond.edu/. 
195.  Id.  
196.  Michaels, supra note 23, at 1053.  
197.  As such Guinchard E., supra note 187, at 199.  See also Nuyts, supra note 23, at 
157; Michaels, supra note 23, at 1054. 
198.  Michaels, supra note 23, at 1053. 
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the European Convention of Human Rights, which is considered to be 
the most advanced international system for the protection of 
fundamental human rights.  According to Article 6 of the ECHR, “in 
the determination of his civil rights and obligations . . . everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”199  Thus, Article 
6 does not expressly guarantee the right of access to courts.  However, 
decisions of the ECtHR have established that the denial of access to 
domestic courts can amount to a breach of Article 6.200 
From a primary law coordination of norms and hierarchical 
perspective, the question arises as to whether Article 6 of the ECHR 
gives rise to a general principle of international or European law 
(hereinafter: general principle of law).  The answer to this question is 
yes, for the following reasons.  First, the characterization as a general 
principle of EU law of the fundamental human rights established by the 
ECHR and emanating from the shared constitutional traditions of the 
Member States, such as the right of access to courts, is explicitly 
rendered by Article 6.3 TEU and by relevant ECJ case law.  Second, the 
right of access to courts can be characterized as a general principle of 
international public law, mutatis mutandis, for the same reasons, 
according to which forum necessitatis is also a general principle of law.  
Third as a general principle of public international law and of EU law, 
the right of access to courts has a direct effect and prevails over 
domestic rules, EU secondary norms, and international conventions.201 
From a content perspective, Article 6 of the ECHR imposes on its 
member States a non-horizontal, positive, and procedural obligation of 
result.202  This obligation is non-horizontal because it does not aim at 
 
199.  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols 
Nos. 3,5,8, and 11 which entered into force on Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20 1971, Jan. 1 1990, and 
Nov. 1 1998 respectively.  
200.  The first decision was taken by the ECtHR in Golder v. United Kingdom, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Application No. 4451/70, ¶¶ 28, 31 (1975), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.  See 
David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, Edward Bates & Carla Buckley, HARRIS, O’BOYLE & 
WARBRICK: LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 235 (2nd ed. 2009) 
according to whom this decision was “one of the most creative steps taken by the European 
Court in its interpretation of any article of the Convention.”  
201.  See supra, the remarks rendered with regard to the forum necessitatis as a general 
principle of law. 
202. See Cordula Dröge, Positive Verpflichtungen der Staaten in der Europäischen 
Menschenrechtskonvention, in BEITRÄGE ZUM AUSLÄNDISCHEN ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHT 
UND VÖLKERRECHT 159, 380 (2003), available at 
http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/beitr159.pdf.  
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protecting the rights-holder against interference by another private 
party, but rather from interference by the State itself.203  This obligation 
is positive because it does not require that States “refrain from acting”204 
but rather requires that they take positive actions to facilitate the 
fundamental human right of access to courts.  The obligation is 
procedural because it operates at the procedural level, rather than at the 
substantive level, of adjudication.205  This obligation is an obligation of 
result because it imposes on member States the duty to immediately 
facilitate the right of access to courts, as opposed to simply requiring 
that they help avoid a violation of the right (i.e., due diligence 
obligation), or set up an internal system capable of realizing the right 
within a prescribed amount of time (i.e., programmatic obligation).206 
Also, the fundamental human right of access to courts goes to the 
core of fundamental human rights, which have a universal nature rather 
than a purely regional character.207  Finally, Article 6 applies with 
respect to proceedings related to “civil rights and obligations,”208 but, 
according to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, “the concept of ‘civil 
rights and obligations’ cannot be interpreted solely by reference to the 
domestic law of the respondent State, but must be given an autonomous 
interpretation in the light of the object and purpose of the 
Convention.”209  Certain questions then arise relating to the 
characterization of the category civil right under Article 6 of the ECHR. 
B. Applicable Law 
The first question that arises is whether the characterization of the 
notion of civil rights under Art. 6 ECHR should be made only with 
respect to the forum’s substantive law, or if it should also be made 
according to foreign laws made applicable by virtue of relevant private 
international law provisions.  According to one thesis, reference should 
only be made to the domestic law of the forum State.210  This thesis finds 
 
203.  See id. at 381.   
204.  Id. at 380. 
205.  See id. at 383.   
206.  See id. at 388.   
207.  See Arnold, supra note 106.  
208.  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols 
Nos. 3,5,8, and 11 which entered into force on Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20 1971, Jan. 1 1990, and 
Nov. 1 1998 respectively. 
209.  COUNCIL OF EUROPE, YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTIONON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 48 (1991). 
210.  See the references in Jean Claude Soyer and Michel De Salvia, Sub art. 6 ECHR, 
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its basis in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, according to which 
“[w]hether or not a right is to be regarded as civil within the meaning of 
this expression in the Convention must be determined by reference to 
the substantive content and effects of the right—and not its legal 
classification—under the domestic law of the State concerned.”211  This 
thesis, however, is unpersuasive for the following reasons.  First, the 
ECtHR jurisprudence just recalled was proffered in a purely domestic 
case that did not pose the question of whether a right could be 
considered as civil by reference to a foreign law.  Second, a literal 
interpretation of the relevant jurisprudence highlights that it not only 
refers to the “substantive” law of the State concerned, but to its 
“domestic” law in general, which includes the State’s private 
international law rules, which may themselves reference foreign law.  
Third, according to recent ECtHR jurisprudence, the terms “domestic 
law” and “internal legal order” are synonymous with the notion of “the 
juridical order of the contracting States.”212  Therefore: 
 
[I]t is possible to interpret this reference as referring to 
the ‘juridical system at stake,’ as much as, to say it 
differently, the legal system applicable to the claim, 
being it relevant or not in light of the ECHR. The lex 
causae can pertain to a juridical system internal or 
external to the ECHR. Thus, the source of the claimed 
right is not relevant; the important thing is that it is 
granted by an internal system of whatever nature.213 
 
Fourth, Article 6 has already been applied by the ECtHR in 
international cases where a right was regarded as “civil” by reference to 
laws distinct from those of the forum State.214  Fifth, the alternative 
thesis advanced here extends the scope of Article 6, and is thus in line 
with the obligation of member States to interpret ECHR norms in an 
 
in La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Commentaire article par article 250 (L.E. 
Pettiti, E. Decaux & P. H. Imbert eds., Paris: Economica 1995). 
211.  König v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. Application No. 6232/73, ¶¶ 89 (1978), available 
at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int. 
212.  See MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 51–52. 
213.  “Il est alors possible d’interpréter cette référence comme visant ‘le système 
juridique en cause,’ soit, en d’autre termes, l’ordre juridique applicable à la cause, qu’il relève 
ou non de la CEDH.  La lex causae peut émaner d’un ordre juridique tant interne qu’externe 
à la Convention. Ainsi, peu importe la source du droit revendiqué, l’essentiel est qu’il trouve 
un fondement dans un ordre juridique interne quelconque.” Id. at 52–53. 
214.  See id. at 62. 
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extensive way. 
C.  Nature of the Proceeding 
A second question that arises is whether the administrative 
proceedings related to the granting of registered IPRs fall within the 
category of proceedings related to civil rights.  Note that this question 
does not relate to unregistered IPRs, since those rights come into being 
without condition of formalities and therefore without administrative 
proceedings.  According to the Human Rights Commission, while 
“[t]here is no doubt that patent rights, once granted, must be considered 
as civil rights within the meaning of Article 6(1)[,]”215 this Article does 
not encompass proceedings between private persons and administrative 
organs related to “the registration of patents.”216  Hence, those 
proceedings: 
 
do[] not concern . . . the legal relationship between 
private persons, but the objective right of an inventor vis-
à-vis the Administration to be granted a patent if he has 
fulfilled the necessary material and formal conditions.  It 
is true that the law provides that other private persons 
may file objections against the registration of a patent in 
a given case . . . .  But it is also true that these objections 
are limited to arguments that the objective conditions of 
registration are not fulfilled.”217 
 
Thus, “under these circumstances the registration of patents must be 
considered as an essentially administrative matter which is outside the 
scope of Article 6 of the Convention.”218 
As a matter of fact, however, this jurisprudence has been overruled 
by subsequent case law related to patents and designs.  As for patents, 
the ECtHR has established that “the patent application proceedings . . . 
concern[] ‘the determination of civil rights and obligations’” and 
therefore fall within the scope of Article 6 of the ECHR.219  As for 
 
215.  X v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R.  Application No. 7830/70, at 201 (1978), available at 
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.   
216.  Id. at 202. 
217.  Id. at 201.  
218.  Id. at 201.  See also X v. Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R. Application No. 8000/77 
(1978). 
219.  British-American Tobacco Co. v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. Application No. 
19589/92, ¶ 67 (1995), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.  However, as regarding the right 
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designs, the European Commission has established that an 
administrative proceeding “decisive for the registration of the 
applicant’s design [is] . . . comparable to that of a patent [and] . . . 
therefore . . . involve[s] a determination of ‘civil rights’ within the 
meaning of Article 6 . . . .”220 
This new ECtHR case law is convincing and may be extended to all 
other registered IPRs, for the following reasons.  First, in the Budweiser 
decision of 2007, the ECtHR recognized that “an applicant for the 
registration of a trade mark . . . owned a set of proprietary rights . . . 
even though they can be revoked under certain conditions.”221  This 
decision supports the thesis that is related to patents but that is also 
reasonably extendable to any IPRs and according to which “there 
should be no doubt that the applicant for a patent, as well as the 
patentee who seeks to have his revoked patent reinstated are both 
protected under Article 6 (1) ECHR.”222  Second, in regard to patents 
within the various patent systems “the applicant is already presumed to 
be the owner of the invention, regardless of its patentability.”223  Third, 
in regards to any IPRs, ECtHR jurisprudence generally incorporates 
within the notion of civil rights and obligations all disputes between 
private persons and the State that do not concern the execution of 
sovereign powers, and since as already mentioned, IPRs are not an 
expression of the sovereignty of their granting States, proceedings in 
 
to be heard, which is also based on Article 6 ECHR, the more recent Strasbourg 
jurisprudence does not analyze whether the EPO proceeding at stake infringes this right but 
limits itself to state that “the European Patent Convention provides for equivalent protection 
as regards the Convention.” Rambus Inc. v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. Application No. 
40382/04, at 2 (2009), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int (citing Lenzing AG v. Germany, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. Application. No. 39025/97 (1999)).  On these decisions and the Lenzing case 
also before the European Strasbourg Court and the German Constitutional Court, see Jochen 
Pagenberg, The ECJ on the Draft Agreement for a European Community Patent Court – 
Hearing of May 18, 2010, INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 695 (2010).  This 
jurisprudence is therefore grounded on the principle of equivalence and is criticizable for all 
the reasons that will be analyzed at the last paragraph of this paper.  See also id. for critical 
terms.  
220.  Denev v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. Application No. 25419/94 (1997), available at 
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
221. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 78 (2007), 
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.  See also Smith Kline and French Labs. Ltd. v. 
Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87 Eur. Ct. H.R.  (1990), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int; 
Melnychuk v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R. Application No. 28743/03 (2005), available at 
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int; Balan v. Moldova, App. No. 19247/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available 
at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
222.  See CATARINA HOLTZ, DUE PROCESS FOR INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY: EUROPEAN 
PATENTING UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS CONTROL 132 (2003). 
223.   See id. at 131. 
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respect thereto do not involve sovereign powers. 
D.  Possible Restrictions of the Right 
The right of access to courts is not an absolute right.  Hence, certain 
restrictions on this right “are permitted by implication since the right of 
access by its very nature calls for regulation by the State.”224  
Consequently, States may establish such regulations in accordance with 
a certain “margin of appreciation”225 of the “needs and resources of the 
community and of individuals.”226  However, these limitations fall within 
the purview of the ECtHR’s oversight and control.  Thus, in verifying 
the legal character of such regulations, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
is authoritative, and a review thereof reveals that restrictions on the 
right of access to courts must be established by law, must have a 
legitimate aim, and must respond to the principle of proportionality. 
As for the establishment by law requirement, restrictions must “have 
some basis in domestic law,”227 be it of a statutory or a case law nature,228 
and have some internal or international origin.229  Furthermore, the laws 
establishing the restrictions must have a certain “quality,”230 that is, they 
must be “accessible to the person concerned,”231 “compatible with the 
rule of law,”232 “consistent, clear and precise [and] . . . foreseeab[le].”233 
As for the requirement of a legitimate aim, among the aims the 
ECtHR has considered legitimate are “advantages for the individual 
concerned,”234 advantages “for the administration of justice,”235 
 
224.  Fogarty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 37112/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 33 (2001), 
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
225.  Id. at ¶ 33. 
226.   Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 38 (1975). 
227.  Kruslin v. France, App. No. 11801/85, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 27 (1990), available at 
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
228.  Ass’n Ekin v. France, App. No. 39288/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 46 (2001), available at 
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int, according to which “the concept of ‘law’ must be understood in its 
‘substantive’ sense, not its ‘formal’ one. It therefore includes everything that goes to make up 
the written law, including enactments of lower rank than statutes.”  Id. 
229.  See MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 62, 133. 
230.  Kruslin, App. No. 11801/85 at ¶ 27. 
231.  Id.  
232.  Id.   
233.  Ekin, App. No. 39288/98 at ¶ 46.  See also De Geouffre de la Pradelle v. France, 
App. No. 12964/87, at 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 12, 1992), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int 
(according to which the rule of law should be “sufficiently coherent and clear”). 
234.  Deweer v. Belgium, App. No. 6903/75, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 49 (1980), available at 
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int; Acquaviva v. France, App. No. 19248/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 66 (1995), 
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int   (“secure the interests of the defen[s]e”). 
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compliance with public international law, and cooperation between 
legal systems.236 
With regard to the proportionality requirement, the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR maintains that restrictions on the right of access are 
proportionate where they realize a fair balance between the limits to the 
right of access to courts and the aim sought to be achieved by the 
restrictions. 237  In establishing whether this balance exists, member 
States possess a margin of appreciation.  However, this margin of 
appreciation is subject to the control of the ECtHR in several respects.  
First, in determining whether the State has exceeded its margin of 
appreciation, the ECtHR examines the limitation applied to see if it 
impairs the very essence of the right of access to courts.  Furthermore, 
the ECtHR adopts a restrictive method of interpretation that favors the 
right of access.  Hence, according to the ECtHR, the “right of access to 
the courts [holds] . . . prominent place . . . in a democratic society.”238  
This conclusion is in line with the need to extensively interpret the right 
of access to courts, especially when the right to be adjudicated by the 
petitioned court is also a fundamental human right, as is the case with 
IPRs. 
E.  International Jurisdiction Rules 
Within this framework, one question that arises is whether a 
member State of the ECHR is in breach of Article 6 when such State’s 
courts refuse to try a case on the grounds that they do not have 
international jurisdiction according to the relevant applicable 
international jurisdiction rules.239  The ECtHR has answered this 
question on several occasions, maintaining that these rules can in 
principle violate Article 6 of the ECHR. However, the ECtHR has also 
invoked certain “peculiarities” or circumstances in denying that a 
breach of Article 6 ECHR occurred.  These conclusions seem grounded 
on criticizable reasons of a political nature.  Indeed, the following pages 
 
235.  Deweer, App. No. 6903/73 at ¶ 49.  On the sound administration of justice see 
MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 145; Luigi Mari, Equo Processo e Competenza in Materia 
Contrattuale, NEW INSTRUMENTS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 673, 679 (2009).  
236.  See MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 145. 
237.  On the proportionality requirement as a general principle of international public 
law see ENZO CANNIZZARO, IL PRINCIPIO DELLA PROPORZIONALITÀ 
NELL'ORDINAMENTO INTERNAZIONALE (2d. ed. 2000); RYNGAERT, supra note 12, at 158 
n.11. 
238.  Airey v. Ireland, App. No. 6289/73, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 24 (1979), available at 
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
239.    See Fawcett, supra note 187, at 3. 
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do not expose the numerous arguments that can be raised in opposition 
to the solutions adopted by the ECtHR in such cases, but rather present 
a systematic reconstruction of the principles that have been emphasized 
by the ECtHR and that are relevant to demonstrate that the exclusive 
jurisdiction rules go against the right of access to courts.240 
In the first case, the applicant, a dual Turkish and German citizen, 
petitioned before a German Court an Iraqi Bank for breach of 
contract.241  The German Court proceeded to ascertain whether the case 
was sufficiently linked to Germany by reason of the plaintiff’s 
nationality, to confer jurisdiction to hear the case. However, according 
to Germany’s domestic rules on international civil procedure, such a 
link was not sufficient to find German jurisdiction. Thus, the German 
Court determined that it lacked competence to hear the case.  The 
applicant, then, asked the ECtHR to assess whether the German 
Court’s failure to find jurisdiction infringed his fundamental human 
right of access to courts.  The ECtHR responded that the right of access 
to courts “does not imply an unlimited right to choose the competent 
tribunal.  The international private law rules that limit the party 
autonomy relevance are not incompatible as such to Article 6 § 1 of the 
Convention.”242 
However, these rules on international jurisdiction must not be 
arbitrary, but rather must be established by law.  The court found that 
these conditions were met, since 
 
in the concrete case, having deeply examined the case 
the German Courts concluded that they did not have 
jurisdiction over it.  They have deeply grounded their 
decision.  The reasons indicated by the German Courts 
and criticized by the applicant exclude that these Courts 
have come up with arbitrary conclusions attempting to 
the equitableness of the proceeding at stake.243 
 
240.  With respect to the exclusive jurisdiction rules it seems that a systematic 
reconstruction of the ECtHR jurisprudence is currently still absent in the legal writings.  
However, on the general incompatibility of the exclusive jurisdiction rules and the right of 
access to courts see Arroyo, supra note 19, at 74.  
241.  Bayrak v. Germany, App. No. 27937/95 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000), available at 
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int (text available only in French). 
242.  “[N]'implique pas un droit illimité de choisir le tribunal compétent. Les règles du 
droit international privé limitant le libre jeu de l'autonomie de la volonté ne sont pas 
incompatibles avec l'article 6 § 1 de la Convention,” Id. at ¶ 2. 
243.  “En l'espèce, les tribunaux allemands ont conclu, après un examen approfondi, à 
l’absence de leur compétence. Ils ont amplement motivé leurs décisions. Les motifs fournis 
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Thus, the court concluded that the German Court’s declining of 
jurisdiction had not improperly restricted the applicant’s fundamental 
human right of access to courts. 
In the second case, the applicant, Prince Hans-Adam II of 
Liechtenstein, having learned that the municipality of Cologne obtained 
a certain painting as a temporary loan from the Czech Republic, 
brought a proceeding before the Cologne Regional Court against the 
municipality of Cologne, maintaining that his late father was the true 
owner of the loaned painting, which had been illegally confiscated from 
his father by the government of the former Czechoslovakia in 1946.244  
The applicant requested that the municipality of Cologne deliver the 
painting to him, as his father’s heir.245  The German Court considered 
whether the case was sufficiently linked to Germany, given that the 
painting was in German territory and that the defendant was a German 
municipality, for it to hear the case.246  Here however, Chapter 6, Article 
3, of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the 
War and Occupation, “excluded any review, by German Courts, of 
measures carried out with regard to German external assets or other 
property, seized for the purpose of reparation or restitution, or as a 
result of the State of war.”247  In the case in question, the former 
government of Czechoslovakia had confiscated the painting in 1946 as a 
measure against a German citizen as reparation for war damages.248  
Thus, the German Court declined its jurisdiction. 249 
The applicant then asked the ECtHR to assess whether this 
declining of jurisdiction infringed his fundamental human right of access 
to courts.250  The ECtHR emphasized that member States are 
responsible for violating Article 6 of the ECHR even where they “limit 
the applicant’s right of access to a Court in order to give effect to the 
rules of an international agreement excluding [their] jurisdiction . . . .”251  
 
dans les décisions judiciaires critiquées par le requérant permettent d'exclure que les juges 
aient tiré des conclusions de caractère arbitraire de nature à porter atteinte à l'équité de la 
procédure.”  Id. at ¶ 2. 
244.  Hans-Adam II v. Germany, App. No. 42527/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 10–16 (2001), 
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.  
245.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
246.  Id. at ¶ 16. 
247.  Id. at ¶ 61. 
248.  Id. at ¶ 11.  
249.  Id. at ¶ 51.  
250.  Id. at ¶ 52. 
251.  Id. at ¶ 52. 
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In the case before it, the court determined that the restriction on the 
applicant’s right of access to the German Court had a legitimate aim, 
since it was “a consequence of the particular status of Germany under 
public international law after the Second World War,”252 and that it 
aimed at realizing “the vital public interest in regaining sovereignty and 
unifying Germany.”253 
Moreover, the restriction on the applicant’s right of access to the 
German Court was proportionate to the aim thereby pursued.  Hence, 
notwithstanding that the ECtHR’s previous jurisprudence had 
established that the proportionality requirement was met only where 
“reasonable alternative means . . .  to protect effectively the rights under 
the Convention” existed,254 the court found that the case before it 
presented peculiarities, such as “the particular status of the Federal 
Republic of Germany under public international law after the Second 
World War,”255 that excluded the application of such jurisprudence.256  
Thus, the restriction on the applicant’s right of access to courts, as 
imposed by the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of 
the War and Occupation, met the proportionality requirement, even in 
the absence of other reasonable means of effective recourse.  The court 
concluded, then, that the declining of jurisdiction by the German Court 
had not improperly restricted the applicant’s right of access to courts.257 
In a third series of cases, the ECtHR dealt with rules regarding 
immunity from jurisdiction of States and International Organization.  
With regard to the immunity from jurisdiction of States, most of the 
cases addressed by the ECtHR concern tort claims related either to 
employment in a foreign diplomatic mission258 or to personal injuries 
sustained from “State “ acts amounting to torture.259  In both of these 
categories of cases, the court pays particular attention as to whether the 
State immunity rules involved not only had a legitimate aim but were 
also proportional to that aim.  As for the requisite for legitimate aim, 
the court has established that “the grant of sovereign immunity to a 
 
252.  Id. at ¶ 59. 
253.   Id. at ¶ 69. 
254.   Id. at ¶ 48. 
255.  Id. at ¶ 68. 
256.  See id. at ¶ 37.  
257.  Id. at ¶ 69. 
258.  See Fogarty v. United Kingdom, App. No.  37112/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), 
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
259.  Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), available 
at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int; McElhinney v. Ireland, App. No. 31253/96 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), 
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
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State in civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with 
international law to promote comity and good relations between States 
through the respect of another State’s sovereignty.”260  As for the 
requisite for degree of proportionality, the court has maintained that 
“measures taken by a High Contracting Party which reflect generally 
recogni[z]ed rules of public international law on State immunity cannot 
in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on 
the right of access to Court as embodied in Article 6 § 1.”261 
With regard to immunity from jurisdiction of International 
Organization the most relevant case is Waite v. Germany.262  In this case, 
the plaintiffs were two British citizens residing in Germany, who were 
employed by a British Company and placed at the disposal of the 
European Space Agency (ESA) to perform services at the European 
Space Operations Center in Germany.263  The applicants, after having 
been informed that their employment with the British Company would 
soon terminate, instituted proceedings before a German Labor Court 
against the ESA, “arguing that, pursuant to the German Provision of 
Labor (Temporary Staff) Act (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz), they 
had acquired the status of employees of the ESA.”264  The ESA replied 
that its immunity impeded the exercise of jurisdiction by the German 
Courts.265  The German Courts agreed, determining that the ESA had 
validly relied on its immunity, and consequently declined to take 
jurisdiction over the applicants’ claims.266 
The applicants then asked the ECtHR to assess whether this 
declining of jurisdiction infringed their fundamental human right of 
access to courts.267  The ECtHR, in turn, verified whether the restriction 
placed on the applicants’ right of access to the German Court pursued a 
legitimate aim and was proportionate, stating, with regard to the 
requirement for legitimate aim: 
 
 
260.  Al-Adsani, App. No. 35763/97 at ¶ 54.  This conclusion is highly criticized. See 
HARRIS, O’BOYLE, & WARBRICK, supra note 200, at 243 n.170. 
261.  McElhinney, App. No. 31253/96 at 37; Al-Adsani, App. No. 35763/97 at ¶ 54. 
262.  Waite v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999), available at  
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.  See also Beer and Regan v. Germany, App. No. 28934/95, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (1999), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
263.  Waite, App. No. 26083/942 at ¶¶ 11–13. 
264.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
265.  Id. at ¶ 17. 
266.  Id. at ¶ 17–26. 
267.  Id. at ¶ 43. 
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[T]he attribution of privileges and immunities to 
international organi[z]ation is an essential means of 
ensuring the proper functioning of such organi[z]ation 
free from unilateral interference by individual 
governments.  The immunity from jurisdiction commonly 
accorded by States to international organi[z]ation under 
the organi[z]ation constituent instruments or 
supplementary agreements is a long-standing practice 
established in the interest of the good working of these 
organi[z]ation. The importance of this practice is 
enhanced by a trend towards extending and 
strengthening international cooperation in all domains of 
modern society.268 
 
Thus, “the rule of immunity from jurisdiction, which the German Courts 
applied to ESA in the present case, has a legitimate objective.”269  
Likewise with regard to proportionality, the court stated that, on the 
one hand, this requirement had to be verified both “in light of the 
concrete circumstances of the case”270 and “in view of the prominent 
place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial,”271 and on 
the other hand, that the following two factors were relevant to 
determine the proportionality of the restrictions at issue.  First, “the 
applicants [must have] . . .  had available to them reasonable alternative 
means to protect . . . their rights under the Convention.”272  Second, 
these means must have been “effective.”273  In the case before it, the 
court verified that 
 
the ESA Convention, together with its Annex I, 
expressly provides for various modes of settlement of 
private-law disputes, in staff matters as well as in other 
litigation . . . . Since the applicants argued an 
employment relationship with ESA, they could and 
should have had recourse to the ESA Appeals Board.274 
 
268.  Id. at ¶ 63.  
269.  Id. at ¶ 63.  
270.  Id. at ¶ 64. 
271.  Id. at ¶ 67. 
272.  Id. at ¶ 68.  
273.  Id. at ¶ 68. 
274.  Id. at ¶ 69. 
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However, since the applicants invoked rights that were established by 
German substantive labor law and not by the ESA, its dispute 
settlement bodies probably would have dismissed their recourse, thus 
providing them with an ineffective adjudication alternative.  
Nonetheless, according to the court, it was possible to presume that 
recourse to another effective tribunal existed in the case at hand since 
all legal systems, and thus also the German one, are “in principle open 
to temporary workers to seek redress from the firms that have 
employed them and hired them out.  Relying on general labour [sic] 
regulations or, more particularly, on the German Provision of Labour 
[sic] (Temporary Staff) Act, temporary workers can file claims in 
damages against such firms.”275  Thus, the court concluded that the 
German Court’s declining of jurisdiction by reason of the ESA’s 
immunity did not improperly restrict the applicants’ right of access to  
courts.276 
To synthesize, a domestic court must adjudicate a case, even where it 
would not generally do so according to its international procedure 
norms, when its declining of jurisdiction would violate the right of access 
to courts.  Also, Article 6 of the ECHR obliges member States, in 
principle, to grant access to their courts whenever a case is sufficiently 
and not fortuitously linked to the forum State.277 
In contrast, member States can restrict the right of access to their 
courts where all of the following four requirements are met.  First, the 
restrictions are established by law (whether of a domestic or an 
international origin, and whether of a case law or a statutory nature), 
and the law is sufficiently clear.  Second, the restrictions pursue a 
legitimate aim, which, according to the ECtHR, is the case only when 
they comply with public international law.278  Third, the restrictions are 
proportionate to the aim pursued; according to the ECtHR, restrictions 
are proportionate when they pertain to cases involving the immunity of 
 
275.  Id. at ¶ 70. 
276.  Id. at ¶ 73. 
277.  See Mari, supra note 235, at 678.  See also supra note 176 (explaining doctrine); 
Bayrak v. Germany, App. No. 27937/95 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000), available at 
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int; and; Hans-Adam II v. Germany, App. No. 42527/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2001), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.  See also the dissenting opinion judge Rozakis in 
McElhinney v. Ireland, App. No. 31253/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), available at 
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.  On this dissenting opinion see infra. 
278.  Hence, examination of the European case law manifests that the aim of the sound 
administration of justice is relevant only with respect to internal rules of competence in pure 
internal cases.  See also MARI, supra note 235, at 678. 
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subjects, or present peculiarities such as “the particular status of the 
Federal Republic of Germany under public international law after the 
Second World War.”279  In contrast, restrictions are not proportionate 
when they impair in its essence the right of access to courts.  Fourth, the 
applicant can protect his or her rights through the use of other 
reasonable and effective alternative means of recourse. 
F.  Alternative Means of Recourse 
Particularly with respect to the last requirement, i.e., the existence of 
(reasonable) alternative means of recourse, another question arises: 
whether this requirement should be read as an alternative means in a 
third State or in an  international organization (hereinafter: third States 
and international organization will be jointly referred to as third States), 
or whether it should be interpreted as requiring alternative means 
within the forum/defendant (hereafter defendant) State before the 
ECtHR that declines jurisdiction. 
According to the part of the ECtHR’s Waite and Kennedy decision 
that established that the existence of (reasonable) alternative means of 
recourse should be read as an alternative means of recourse in either a 
third State or third legal system, rather than in the defendant State, this 
requirement is met when alternative means exist in a third State, rather 
than within the defendant State.  So a first thesis maintains that this 
conclusion takes into account the plurality of legal systems, is a 
consequence of the coordination purpose proper of private international 
law and, therefore, “appears particularly welcomed since this 
coordination purpose allows to take into account that the lack of 
competence influences the right of access to a court only temporarily, 
being the interested parties invited to put themselves in a better 
situation.”280  Indeed, this European case law and the thesis proffered in 
support thereof (hereinafter: the thesis here criticized) are not 
persuasive for the following arguments.  
The first argument arises from the inconsistency of the thesis here 
criticized.  On the one hand, it acknowledges that in international cases 
the interests of individuals in having access to courts are even stronger 
than in purely domestic cases, since “the consequences arising out of a 
 
279.  Hans-Adam II v. Germany, App. No. 42527/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 59 (2001), 
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.  
280.  Translated to English from MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 165.  “Apparaît 
particulièrement opportune puisqu’elle permet de prendre en compte le fait que 
l’incompétence affecte le droit d’accès au tribunal seulement de manière temporaire, les 
individus étant invités à mieux se pourvoir.” 
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lacking of international jurisdiction according to private international 
law can reveal themselves to be much more annoying for the interested 
party that the absence of internal competence in the internal legal 
order,”281 and thus “the international element contributes to diminish 
the freedom of States to refuse to adjudicate cases.”282  Yet, on the other 
hand, the thesis here criticized maintains that the same international 
character of the cases at issue allows the courts of the forum State to 
decline jurisdiction whenever another foreign court is competent to hear 
the same case.  Thus, the thesis here criticized supports a conclusion that 
is the exact opposite of the previous conclusion just recalled that it 
purported to maintain. 
The second argument derives from a systematic stricto sensu 
interpretation of Article 6.1 of the ECHR and the ECHR system itself.  
Hence, under the thesis here criticized, when a complaint is made for a 
breach of the ECHR, the ECtHR is obliged to examine the complaint 
by reference not only to the legal system of the respondent State, but 
also to the systems of third-party States, which could eventually include 
ECHR non-member States.  However: 
 
[W]hen a complaint is made for a breach of the 
Convention, the complaint should be examined by the 
[European Court with] reference only to the legal system 
of the respondent State.  Any defects or other problems 
relating to such a system cannot be remedied by 
reference to the legal system of any other High 
Contracting Party, whether neighbo[]ring to the 
respondent State or not.  Therefore, the fact that the 
applicant . . . had the possibility of a judicial remedy in 
[another legal system] in respect of his grievance should 
be irrelevant to the issue before the Court, which was 
solely and exclusively whether the applicant had access 
to the Courts in [the defendant State] in respect of the 
same complaint.283 
 
281.  Translated to English from MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 157.  “Les 
conséquences liées au refus d’une compétence en matière de droit international privé 
peuvent se révéler beaucoup plus ennuyeuses pour les individus que la négation d’une 
compétence territoriale dans l’ordre interne.”   
282.  Translated to English from MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 156.  “L’élément 
international contribue à réduire la liberté des Etats de refuser leur compétence.”  
283.  See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Loukis Loucaides in McElhinney v. Ireland, 
App. No. 31253/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), according to whom “I think it is unfair as well as 
UBERTAZZI - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/2011  1:06 PM 
424  MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
This conclusion ought to be embraced even more fervently in cases 
where the third-party State in question is not an ECHR member. 
The third argument again relies on a systematic stricto sensu 
interpretation of Article 6.1 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the ECHR.  
Hence, the thesis here criticized allows domestic courts to decline their 
jurisdiction whenever other means of recourse exist abroad.  As aliens 
are more often involved in transnational cases than citizens, and 
transnational cases are more likely to be heard by foreign courts than 
are pure internal cases, the right of access to the forum State’s courts 
can be derogated more often in cases involving aliens than in cases 
involving citizens.  Therefore, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
indirectly and de facto discriminates by reason of nationality, and 
thereby contradicts Article 14 of the ECHR.284 
The fourth argument relies on a teleological interpretation of Article 
6.1 of the ECHR.  The opinion here criticized allows domestic courts to 
decline their jurisdiction whenever other means of recourse exist 
abroad.  Thus, this opinion restrictively interprets Article 6 by limiting 
its scope to cases that cannot be heard abroad.  However, such an 
interpretation is contrary to the need to read the provisions posed by 
the ECHR in an extensive way. 
The fifth argument relies on a systematic lato sensu interpretation of 
Article 6.1 of the ECHR and of international jurisdiction rules in 
general.  Here, it is necessary to distinguish international jurisdiction 
rules of an internal or domestic nature from those imposed by 
international conventions.  The former types of rules allocate 
international jurisdiction to the courts of the forum State without 
considering whether other foreign courts are competent to hear the 
same case, and, as such, have a unilateral, rather than a bilateral, 
character.  The opinion here criticized, however, imposes on the 
petitioned courts seized the duty to also take into account the 
international jurisdiction of foreign courts, and as such is contrary to the 
nature of these rules. 
With respect to the international jurisdiction norms of a 
conventional origin, the result is at least partially the same.  These rules 
 
odd to expect the applicant to have recourse to another State as a solution to his problem of 
lack of access to a court in his own country, against which his complaint was directed.”   
284.  On the violation of Article14 ECHR realized by way of indirect discriminations 
see ODDNÝ MJÖLL ARNARDÓTTIR, EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 73 (2003). 
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allocate international jurisdiction to the courts of a member State, this 
time while taking into account whether or not other foreign courts are 
competent to hear the same case, and as such have a bilateral nature.  
However, these rules do not consider the international jurisdiction 
provisions of non-member States; and therefore, have a unilateral 
nature when examined not with respect to the sole systems of their 
member States, but in relation to the entire international framework.  
Thus, this thesis is also contrary to the nature and scope of the 
internationally derived international jurisdiction rules, at least with 
respect to third States. 
The sixth argument also relies on a systematic lato sensu 
interpretation of Article 6.1 of the ECHR, and international jurisdiction 
rules.  The thesis here criticized cites the aim of coordinating the 
proceedings that are proper to international jurisdiction rules.  Yet the 
right of access to courts, as set forth in Article 6 of the ECHR, is a 
fundamental human right.  Thus, the aim of coordinating proceedings 
cannot prevail over the fundamental human right of access to courts.  
This conclusion can be reached even when the international jurisdiction 
rules are established by international conventions.  In this respect, this 
conclusion is in line with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, according to 
which ECHR member States are responsible for violating ECHR 
Article 6 even when they limit the applicant’s right of access to courts in 
order to give effect to the rules of an international agreement. 
The seventh argument is based on opportunity reasons.  The thesis 
here criticized imposes on the forum State’s court a duty to establish, 
before they decline jurisdiction, whether the case at hand can be 
adjudicated effectively by foreign State courts.  However, forum State 
courts apply their own domestic rules of international civil procedure, 
which do not establish the international jurisdiction of foreign State 
courts.  Thus, to verify that other foreign courts have the requisite 
international jurisdiction to hear a case, the forum State’s court must 
verify the domestic rules on international jurisdiction for every legal 
system in the world.  Opportunity reasons, then, suggest exempting 
domestic courts from performing such a difficult or impossible task, and 
instead requiring only that those courts verify if other reasonable means 
of recourse are available within their forum State, according to their 
own international jurisdiction rules. 
The eighth argument is based on the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Rozakis in the McElhinney case.285  The dissent referenced the part of 
 
285.   McElhinney, App. No. 31253/96 at n.209 (Judge Rozakis’ dissenting opinion). 
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the ECtHR’s Waite and Kennedy decision that established that the 
existence of reasonable alternative means of recourse should be read as 
an alternative means of recourse in either a third State or third legal 
system, rather than in the defendant State.286  The dissenting Judge 
maintained that the decision “referred to specific circumstances 
concerning persons working within an international organi[z]ation and 
labour [sic] disputes for which internal proceedings existed and were 
known to the applicants when they decided to become employees of the 
organi[z]ation[,]”287 and emphasized, in contrast, that in cases where the 
defendant is a foreign State, rather than an international organization, 
“the applicant did not have any [such] link with the [foreign State’s] 
jurisdiction . . . or any kind of allegiance and loyalty to [it].”288  The 
Judge thus stated that the part of the Waite and Kennedy decision 
concerning alternative means of recourse did not apply, and the 
requirement of the existence of reasonable alternative means of 
recourse should, accordingly, be read as alternative means within the 
defendant State, rather than in third States.289  This opinion deserves to 
be approved. 
In synthesis, the requirement of the existence of reasonable 
alternative means of recourse cannot be read as alternative means in a 
third State, but must be interpreted as alternative means that allow 
access to the courts of the defendant State.290 
 
286.  Id. at Rozakis’ Dissent ¶ 4. 
287.  Id. at Rozakis’ Dissent ¶ 4. 
288.  Id. at Rozakis’ Dissent ¶ 4. 
289.  Id. at Rozakis’ Dissent ¶ 4.  According to whom “[i]n any event, I seriously 
dispute an unqualified transposition of a principle that the Court applied in a specific 
category of case (e.g. Waite and Kennedy v. Germany)—namely the circumscribed scope of 
Article 6 in circumstances where a State party to the Convention has relinquished parts of its 
jurisdiction to an international organi[z]ation—to all cases involving a jurisdictional 
plurality.”  Id. 
290.  See McElhinney, App. No. 31253/96 (Judge Loucaides’ dissenting opinion), 
according to whom: 
 
it is correct that Article 6 may be subject to inherent limitations, but these 
limitations should not affect the core of the right. Procedural conditions 
such as time-limits, the need for leave to appeal etc. do not affect the 
substance of the right. But completely preventing somebody from having 
his case determined by a Court, without any fault on his part and 
regardless of the nature of the case, contravenes, in my opinion, Article 6 
§ 1 of the Convention. 
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G.  Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Finally, the last question that arises in this context is whether the 
right of access to courts can be improperly restricted by international 
jurisdiction norms that establish exclusive jurisdiction in certain fora.  
The ECtHR has not yet provided an answer to this specific question.  
However, it is apparent that the conclusions reached in parts E and F of 
this Section with respect to all other general international jurisdiction 
rules apply, mutatis mutandis, to exclusive jurisdiction provisions.  
Furthermore, no reasons can be invoked to proscribe this application.  
Thus, the rules on exclusive jurisdiction violate the right of access to 
courts because, by their proper nature, they restrict this access when the 
case at hand does not enter into the exclusive jurisdiction of the forum 
State, although it meets all the requirements necessary to consider 
improper the restriction in question. 
V. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IMPLIES A DENIAL OF JUSTICE AND 
VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS 
A.  Denial of Justice 
The public international law rules on denial of justice, forum 
necessitatis, and on the right of access to courts will now be applied to 
exclusive jurisdiction rules in IPR cases.  To this end the Voda, 
Lucasfilm, and GAT cases will be adopted as examples, because they 
constitute the most recent jurisprudence involving the application of 
exclusive jurisdiction within the context of IPR cross-border litigation.  
Furthermore, with particular reference to Article 6 of the ECHR, while 
it is true that this Article does not apply to the United States, and thus, 
to the Voda case, a systematic interpretation of Article 6 can influence 
the application of the already-examined corresponding rules on right of 
access to courts that are in force in the United States.  Therefore, the 
arguments based on Article 6 can also be adopted, mutatis mutandis, 
with respect to the U.S. Voda case. 
As for denial of justice and forum necessitatis, in the Voda case, both 
parties were U.S.-domiciled companies and the controversy concerned 
several European, British, Canadian, French, and German patents, in 
addition to U.S. patents.291  Accordingly, the case was sufficiently linked 
to the United States, and met the first connection requirement of the 
denial of justice/forum necessitatis rule.  However, the U.S. Court of 
 
291.  Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2007).   
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Voda was required to bring its 
British, Canadian, French, German, and European patent infringement 
claims before the respective courts of the United Kingdom, Canada, 
France, Germany, and each single State for which a European patent 
was granted, since each State was held to have exclusive jurisdiction 
over its patent infringement claims.292  In so holding, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals required that Voda should duplicate its proceedings.293 
The duplication of proceedings in IPR cases has been shown to 
increase their costs.  According to the already-mentioned study 
Economic-Cost Benefit Analysis of a Unified and Integrated European 
Patent Litigation System, 
 
between 146 and 311 patent infringement cases are being 
duplicated annually in EU Member States.  By 2013, this 
number is likely to increase to between 202 and 431 
duplicated cases. Total private savings from having 
access to a unified patent proceeding would span the 
interval between EUR 148 and 289 million.294 
 
Moreover, the costs of the duplication of proceedings are even higher 
where the systems involved are such as the United Kingdom one.  
Hence, “the average cost of pursuing through to first instance trial a 
patent infringement action in the U.K. is approximately 500,000, and 
this is about three times the cost of an infringement action in most other 
European jurisdictions.”295 
Furthermore, the duplication of proceedings in IPR cases can lead to 
divergent outcomes, as occurred in a recent series of cases. 
 
In the Epilady case (EP0101656), infringement suits of 
the patent-holder were successful in Belgium, Germany, 
Italy and the Netherlands, but not successful in Austria, 
France and the United Kingdom.  In Securities System 
Inc. vs. ECB (EP0455750), the German and Dutch 
 
292.  Id. at 898–904. 
293.  Id. at 898–904. 
294.  See Harhoff, supra note 149, at 5.  This study refers explicitly to the Unified 
Patent Court (ECPC), see infra.  However, its results are extensible to any other unitary 
enforcement system of national and foreign patents. 
295.  See David Knight, The Reducing Cost of European and U.K. Patent Litigation?, 
PATENT WORLD (May 28, 2008), http://www.ffw.com/publications/all/articles/reducing-cost-
patent.aspx. 
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Courts upheld the patent, while it was revoked in France 
and the UK.  In the Senseo case (EP0404717), initial 
divergent rulings have been issued by Belgian and Dutch 
Courts, but several other national cases are still pending.  
In the Monsanto case (EP0546090), the District Court of 
The Hague gave an interim judgment on March 19, 2008 
and referred the case to the European Court of Justice 
for an interpretation of Directive 98/44/EC of 6.7.1998 on 
the legal protection of biotechnological inventions; 
several parallel cases are pending in different Member 
States.296 
 
Moreover, another case that exemplifies the risk of divergent 
outcomes due to the duplication of proceedings is the European Central 
Bank (ECB) v. Document Security Systems Inc. (DSS) case.297  To 
properly describe this case, it is relevant to refer to the wording of the 
decision rendered by the U.K. Court of Appeal on March 19, 2008.  The 
controversy according to the court was that a U.S. company 
 
contend[ed] that [its] patent . . . and its sister patents are 
infringed by euro banknotes.  Imaginatively but 
overoptimistically it tried to bring central proceedings 
before the Court of First Instance of the EU.  On  5th 
September  2007, that Court held, not surprisingly, it had 
no jurisdiction to hear patent infringement proceedings 
even against an EU institution, case T-295/05.  
Meanwhile the ECB had started revocation proceedings 
in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria.  These are 
ongoing.298 
 
Prior to the U.K. Court of Appeals decision, there were several 
conflicting judgments coming from different jurisdictions concerning the 
validity of the patent:299 
 
 
296.  See Harhoff, supra note 149, at 15 n.20. 
297.  See European Central Bank v. Document Security Systems Inc., [2008] EWCA 
(Civ). 192 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2008/192.html. 
298.   Id. at ¶¶ 3–4. 
299.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
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The German Federal Patent Court 
(Bundespatentgericht) did not agree with [the U.K. 
Court of First Instance decision in the case ECB v. DSS 
invalidating the patent and]  . . . held the patent valid.  
Then, on 9 January 2008, the French Court (le Tribunal 
de Grande Instance de Paris) agreed with [the U.K. first 
instance decision] and disagreed with the German Court.  
On 12th March 2008 the Dutch Court agreed with the 
German Court.  In sporting terms, the score is currently 
2-2 to the ECB at first instance level.  All this is deeply 
regrettable.  It illustrates yet again the need for a one-
stop patent shop (with a ground floor department for 
first instance and a first floor department for second 
instance) for those who have Europe-wide businesses.300 
 
Finally, the U.K. Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal and 
confirmed the first instance decision holding the patent void.301 
In light of the above, requiring the plaintiff in the Voda case to 
address its claims to the courts of each of the foreign States where the 
patents had been granted was unreasonable and ineffective, and thereby 
met the second requirement of the denial of justice/forum necessitatis 
rule. 
In the Lucasfilm case, the denial of justice was even more apparent.  
First, the case involved defendants who were not only domiciled in the 
United Kingdom but had also perpetrated their infringing acts from the 
United Kingdom.302  Thus, the U.K. Court’s declining of jurisdiction was 
contrary to the Brussels Regulation.  According to its Article 2 
provision, “persons domiciled in a Member State shall . . . be sued in the 
courts of that Member State.”303  The defendants were domiciled in the 
United Kingdom; therefore, the U.K. Court had jurisdiction to hear the 
case.  However, this conclusion was not reached by the U.K. Court of 
Appeal for two different reasons.  First, Article 2 of the Brussels 
Regulation did not ground the U.K. Court’s jurisdiction, since it 
conditions its application upon the existence of not only the “personal 
jurisdiction,”304 but also the “subject-matter jurisdiction of the court,”305 
 
300.   Id. at ¶¶ 3–5. 
301.  Id. at ¶ 52. 
302.  Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328, ¶¶ 100, 103 (Eng.). 
303.  Id. at  ¶ 123. 
304.  Id. at ¶ 127. 
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which does not exist where “the wrongs [are] done outside the EU by 
persons who happen to be domiciled within the EU.”306  Second, Article 
2 of the Brussels I Regulation did not ground the U.K. Court’s 
jurisdiction since the subject matter of the case at hand entered into the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Courts, which exclusive jurisdiction 
was purportedly established implicitly by the CUP, CUB, PCT and 
TRIPs agreement.307 
However, neither of the arguments adopted by the U.K. Court is 
convincing.  With respect to the first argument, on the one hand, the 
notions of personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction are 
common law concepts extraneous to the Brussels I Regulation, which 
conditions its general application upon the sole presence of the 
defendants’ domicile inside the European Union, without posing any 
further proximity requirements to the EU territory.308  On the other 
hand, the Lucasfilm case presented additional connections to the EU 
territory, since the defendants perpetrated the infringing acts from the 
United Kingdom.  With respect to the second argument, as we have 
already noted, the purported implicit exclusive jurisdiction provision in 
the CUP, CUB, PCT and TRIPs agreement not only does not exist, but 
nevertheless it would be contrary to public international law if it did. 
Furthermore, even where the Brussels I Regulation was not to be 
applied, the U.K. Court’s declining of jurisdiction was contrary to forum 
necessitatis, since the Lucasfilm case presented a sufficient link with the 
United Kingdom to meet the first requirement of the denial of 
justice/forum necessitatis rule.  Also, according to the U.K. Court of 
 
305.  Id. at ¶ 127.    
306.  Id. at ¶ 129.   
307.  See id. at ¶ 107–108.   
308.  See Competence of the Community to Conclude the New Lugano Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, ECJ 145 (Feb. 7, 2006); Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383 
¶¶ 25–26.  See also Torremans, supra note 6, at 752 according to whom in the Lucasfilm case: 
 
the dangerous consequence of the analysis put forward by the Court of 
Appeal is that this jurisdiction is declined and that a substantial risk is 
created that not a single court will be available and willing to hear the 
case and to do justice between the parties. The Court itself indicates that 
Ainsworth does no longer travel to the US and will in this way be able to 
escape the jurisdiction of the US courts, and in the next phase the Court 
of Appeal refuse to recognise and enforce the Californian judgment in the 
U.K. This kind of denial of justice is undesirable and dangerous, but it will 
be the inevitable consequence of the approach taken by the court. 
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Appeal, the United States had exclusive jurisdiction to address the 
infringement of U.S. copyrights.  However, the U.K. Court of Appeal 
did not enforce the judgment rendered by the U.S. Court in the 
infringement action already brought by the plaintiffs in the United 
States.  Thus, the United Kingdom’s non-enforcement of the decision of 
the U.S. Court, which was the ordinary competent court according to 
the United Kingdom, rendered access to that U.S. tribunal ineffective 
with respect to the United Kingdom.  Therefore, the non-enforcement 
of the U.S. judgment constituted a legal obstacle to effectively exercise 
the right of access to U.S. Courts.  As such, in the United Kingdom it 
met the second requirement of the denial of justice/forum necessitatis 
rule. 
In the GAT case, both the plaintiff and defendant were companies 
established in Germany.309  The case, therefore, was sufficiently linked 
with Germany to meet the first requirement of the denial of 
justice/forum necessitatis rule.  Moreover, in the GAT case, the patents 
at issue were granted by a single State, France.  Thus, the declining of 
jurisdiction by the German Court imposed by the ECJ’s GAT decision 
obligated the plaintiff to bring the proceeding before a French Court, 
which had ordinary exclusive jurisdiction to hear the validity issues of 
the French patents.  Yet the exclusive jurisdiction of the French Court 
concerned the sole issue of whether the French patents were valid; it did 
not address their infringement.  Rather, the German Court had ordinary 
jurisdiction to examine the infringement claims, by reason of the general 
jurisdiction criterion of the Brussels System, which granted jurisdiction 
to the country of the defendant’s domicile, here, Germany.  As a result, 
the German Court had to stay its proceeding while it referred to the 
French Court the issue of the French patents’ validity, and after the 
French Court’s decision on the validity of the patents, the German 
Court had to resume the case and examine the infringement claims.310  
Indeed, proceeding in this manner would have produced a duplication 
of disputes.  Thus, even the GAT case met the second requirement of 
the denial of justice/forum necessitatis rule. 
 
309.  Case C-4/03, GAT v. LuK, 2006 E.C.R. I-6509, ¶ 8.  
310.  The ECJ GAT decision did not establish explicitly the necessity to proceed in this 
manner. However, this necessity can be gleaned from the interpretation thereof.  See 
Explanatory Report by Professor Fausto Pocar, at 27.  See also supra note 7 (collecting and 
construing jurisprudence that proceeds in this manner, as well as the contrary jurisprudence 
that declines its jurisdiction not only on the validity issues but also on the infringement 
claims). 
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B.  Violation of the Fundamental Human Right of Access to Courts 
As for the fundamental right of access to courts, in the Voda case, by 
virtue of the exclusive jurisdiction rules purported to exist, the U.S. 
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over Voda’s infringement claims 
related to foreign patents.  Thus, in that case, the exclusive jurisdiction 
rules not only impeded Voda’s access to the U.S. Court with respect to 
its foreign patent infringement claims, but also restricted Voda’s 
fundamental human right of access to the U.S. Courts. 
Furthermore, this restriction was improper for the following reasons.  
First, a sufficient and non-fortuitous link existed between the case and 
the forum State.  Second, the restriction on the right of access to courts 
was not established by a sufficiently clear law.  Rather, it was grounded 
on implicit rules of public international law alleged to exist.  Third, the 
restriction did not pursue a legitimate aim.  Here, the purported aim was 
to comply with public international law, but public international law not 
only does not impose implicit exclusive jurisdiction rules, but considers 
such rules illegal.  Fourth, the restriction was not proportionate to the 
aim pursued.  Here, the restriction concerned neither matters regarding 
immunity from jurisdiction nor cases presenting certain recognized 
peculiarities.  The restriction also impaired in its essence the right of 
access to courts, since on the one hand Voda did not have other means 
of recourse available in the United States, and on the other hand, the 
means of recourse available to Voda outside the United States implied a 
duplication of proceedings and, therefore, were ineffective. 
In the Lucasfilm case, the violation of the right of access to courts 
was even more apparent.  There, by virtue of the purported exclusive 
jurisdiction of U.S. Courts, the U.K. Court of Appeal declined to 
exercise jurisdiction over infringement claims of U.S. copyrights.  
Exclusive jurisdiction rules impeded access to the U.K. Court, and 
restricted the plaintiff’s right of access to courts, as set forth in Article 6 
of the ECHR. 
Furthermore, this restriction was illegal for the following reasons.  
First, a sufficient and non-fortuitous link existed between the case and 
the forum State.  Second, for the same reasons explained with respect to 
the Voda case, the restriction on the right of access to courts was not 
established by a sufficiently clear law.  Third, and again for the same 
reasons explicated with respect to the Voda case, the restriction in issue 
did not pursue a legitimate aim.  Fourth, the restriction on the right of 
access to courts was not proportionate to the aim it pursued.  The 
plaintiff did not have other means of recourse available in the United 
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Kingdom, but had other means of recourse available outside the United 
Kingdom.  Thus, the plaintiff supposedly could have brought the 
infringement of his U.S. copyright before a U.S. Court.  Yet the plaintiff 
had already availed himself of this means of recourse, obtaining a 
judgment from the U.S. Courts that the U.K. Court refused to enforce.  
This action thus demonstrated that while, in arguendo, in conformity 
with the ECtHR Waite and Kennedy decision, an “alternative means of 
recourse” existed in a country (the United States) different than the 
forum State (the United Kingdom), this (allegedly) existing available 
alternative means of recourse was in fact ineffective. 
Likewise, in the GAT case, by virtue of an extensive interpretation 
of the exclusive jurisdiction rules posed by Article 16.4 of the Brussels 
Convention, the German Court had to decline its jurisdiction with 
respect to the validity claims of the plaintiff’s French patents.  Thus, 
here again, the application of exclusive jurisdiction rules would have 
impeded access to the German Court and restricted LuK’s right of 
access to courts, as established in Article 6 of the ECHR. 
Furthermore, this restriction was illegal for the following reasons.  
First, a sufficient and non-fortuitous link existed between the case and 
Germany.  Second, the restriction on the right of access to courts was 
not established by a sufficiently clear law.  Rather, the restriction in 
issue was grounded in an extensive interpretation by the ECJ of Article 
16.4 of the Brussels Convention that does not explicitly extend the scope 
of the exclusive jurisdiction rule to IPR validity issues not raised in a 
principal way but rather as a plea in objection.  Moreover, before the 
GAT decision, the ECJ had highlighted the “restrictive nature of the 
provision contained in Article 16 (4)”311 and thus had interpreted it in a 
restrictive way.  That interpretative treatment thus gave rise to a 
legitimate expectation that a restrictive interpretation was to also be 
adopted with respect to IPR validity issues raised as a plea in an 
objection, excluding them from the scope of Article 16.4.  Third, for the 
same reasons explicated with respect to the Voda case, the restriction at 
issue did not pursue a legitimate aim.  Fourth, the restriction was not 
proportionate to the aim pursued.  LuK did not have other means of 
recourse available in Germany, and while other means of recourse were 
available to LuK outside Germany, the utilization of those means 
produced a duplication of proceedings that thereby made them 
ineffective.312 
 
311.  See Case 288/82, Duijnstee v. Goderbauer, 1983 E.C.R. 3663, ¶ 23. 
312.  This duplication of proceedings is different from that of certain legal systems, 
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C. PIL and Human Rights Solutions 
In the Voda, Lucasfilm, and GAT cases, then, the rules on exclusive 
jurisdiction resulted in denial of justice to the respective IPR owners, 
violating forum necessitatis and the fundamental human right of access 
to courts.  Since the Voda, Lucasfilm, and GAT cases are the most 
recent expression of the application of exclusive jurisdiction in IPR 
cross-border litigation, mutatis mutandis, their conclusions may be easily 
extended to all other international IPR disputes. 
To avoid denial of justice and to safeguard the right of access to 
courts, States should follow three different, concurrent approaches, each 
of which leads to the same results.  First, from a de lege ferenda 
perspective States must declare as unconstitutional or overrule their 
explicit exclusive jurisdiction provisions, and also revisit their case law 
according to which exclusive jurisdiction rules are implicitly imposed by 
public international law.  Second, also from a de lege lata perspective 
States must adopt “the private international law solution”313 (hereafter 
the PIL solution).  According to the PIL solution, States must search for 
other rules of private international law that are different and prevailing 
over the rules that would otherwise lead to the declining of jurisdiction.  
Then, States must find these rules in forum necessitatis, which is a PIL 
rule and a general principle of law, and which therefore has a direct 
effect and prevails over exclusive jurisdiction rules (domestic or of the 
Brussels system).  Finally, States must adopt this forum and thus 
exercise jurisdiction by necessity despite exclusive jurisdiction 
provisions.  Third, always from a de lege lata perspective, States must 
adopt “the human rights solution.”314  According to this solution, States 
must recognize the right of access to courts as a general principle of law, 
and in any case the ECHR primacy over the other international, 
European, and domestic rules on exclusive jurisdiction, such as those of 
the Brussels System.  Then, the States must recognize that to decline 
jurisdiction by reason of the exclusive jurisdiction rules would constitute 
a breach of the ECHR by a court.  Furthermore, States must refer to 
 
such as the German one, according to which the German Court competent to address the IPR 
validity issue incidentally raised is not the same court that is competent to examine its 
infringement issue.  Hence, it is apparent that the former kind of duplication of proceedings 
requires much more “entry thresholds (such as language, distance, costs, mentality) for 
parties to the litigation system” than the latter one.  Jaeger et al., supra note 149, at 826, 
referring to the ECPC on which see infra. 
313.  See James Fawcett, supra note 187, at 37. 
314.  Id.  
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this violation “as the ground for not so acting,”315 and therefore of not 
declining jurisdiction.  Finally, States must exercise jurisdiction despite 
exclusive jurisdiction provisions. 
As for the PIL solution, in the Voda case, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
should have exercised its jurisdiction by necessity over all of Voda’s 
infringement claims, regardless of whether the patents involved were 
national or foreign.  Likewise, in the Lucasfilm case, the U.K. Court of 
Appeal should have exercised its jurisdiction by necessity to enforce the 
U.S. copyrights at stake.  Finally, in the GAT case, the German Court 
should have exercised its jurisdiction by necessity over both LuK’s 
French patents’ validity and infringement claims.  Particularly with 
respect to the GAT case, the exercise of jurisdiction by necessity by the 
German Court over the validity of LuK’s French patents is contrary to 
the ECJ’s GAT decision. 
However, a literal interpretation of this decision highlights that it 
does not address the compatibility of forum necessitatis with the 
exclusive jurisdiction rules of the Brussels Convention and, thus, cannot 
be interpreted as maintaining that the latter prevails with respect to the 
former.  Second, a teleological interpretation of the ECJ’s GAT decision 
highlights that the court did not intend to speak on the compatibility of 
forum necessitatis and the exclusive jurisdiction rules of the Brussels 
Convention; thus, its decision cannot be construed in that sense.  Third, 
allowing the German Court to exercise its jurisdiction by necessity is in 
line with the already-demonstrated finding that forum necessitatis is 
adoptable within the framework of the Brussels System, even in 
derogation of its exclusive jurisdiction provisions.  Finally, even 
assuming, in arguendo, that the GAT decision was interpreted as 
implying the prevalence of the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the 
Brussels System over forum necessitatis, EU member States would 
nonetheless be compelled to derogate from the precedent set by that 
ECJ case to realize the general principle of law of forum necessitatis. 
As for the human rights solution, the U.S. Court of Appeals in the 
Voda case should have exercised jurisdiction over all of Voda’s patent 
infringements claims, regardless of whether the patents involved were 
national or foreign; the U.K. Court of Appeal in the Lucasfilm case 
should have exercised its jurisdiction to enforce the U.S. copyrights at 
issue; and the German Court in the GAT case should have exercised its 
jurisdiction over both LuK’s validity and infringement claims.  
Particularly with regard to the GAT case, the infringement of Article 
 
315.  Id.  
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16.4 of the Brussels Convention (now Article 22.4 of the Brussels I 
Regulation) that would have, according to the ECJ, followed from the 
German Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the validity issues of the 
French patents, would have been necessary for the German State to 
avoid liability for violating Article 6 of the ECHR. 
Finally, with particular reference to the GAT case, the result just 
proposed was partially achieved by a recent Dutch decision rendered by 
the District Court of The Hague in the 2007 Single Buoy Moorings v. 
Bluewater case.316  In this case, the owner of a European patent sued a 
Dutch company, claiming that by manufacturing and/or offering the 
essential parts of the plaintiff’s patented invention with knowledge that 
such parts would be installed by a third party in two countries for which 
the plaintiff had been granted the European patent (U.K. and Norway), 
the defendant committed “a special form of indirect cross-border 
infringement.”317  The defendant raised the question of the invalidity of 
the European patent before the Dutch Court.  Thus, according to the 
ECJ’s GAT decision, the Dutch Court should have declined its 
jurisdiction (at least) on the validity issues of the English and Norway 
portions of the European patent at stake.  However, the District Court 
of The Hague distinguished between the GAT case and the dispute 
before it, stating that while the former “concerned a declaration of non-
infringement of a European patent in various countries (and thus with a 
possibility to split up in a declaration per country),” the claim before the 
Dutch Court concerned a declaration of infringement and “contain[ed] 
the judgment of the validity of a European patent in two territories” and 
therefore was “different from GAT/LuK,” and unlike GAT could “not 
be split up.”318  In other words, the claim before the German Court in 
GAT concerned the judgment of the validity of a French patent in just 
one territory (France).  However, in the case before the Dutch Court, 
 
316.  Cross-border Jurisdiction after GAT/LuK: International “Indirect” Infringement, 




3925&aid=9631.  See also John Anders, et al., Liability for Contributory Infringement of IPRs 
– Certain Aspects of Patent Infringement, THE NETH. INT’L ASSOC. FOR THE PROT. OF 
INTELL. PROP., available at 
https://www.aippi.org/download/comitees/204/GR204the_netherlands.pdf.  On contributory 
infringement see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Rochelle Dreyfuss, & Annette Kur, The Law 
Applicable To Secondary Liability In Intellectual Property Cases, 42 JILP 201, (2009).  
317.  See NautaDutilh, supra note 316. 
318.  Id. at 4.4. 
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the claim would involve determining the validity of a European patent 
in two territories, U.K. and Norway, creating a risk of conflicting 
judgments with respect to validity which in the Dutch Court’s opinion 
would have rendered reaching a judgment on infringement impossible.  
The court considered this undesirable and in conflict with Article 6 of 
the ECHR.319 
Furthermore, the Dutch Court established that although it 
considered itself to be competent to adjudicate the case, the exclusive 
jurisdiction provision of the Brussels System as interpreted by the ECJ 
GAT decision obliged it to “defer a decision concerning the validity of a 
foreign patent, if nullity proceedings are instituted in the involved 
foreign country, without regard to the stage of the Dutch 
proceedings.”320  However, since in the case in question, no nullity 
proceedings had been instituted before the implicated Norwegian and 
U.K. Courts, the Dutch Court decided to examine the European patent 
validity issue with respect to its Norwegian and U.K. parts as raised by 
the defendant. 
This decision deserves to be particularly welcomed because it takes 
into account the inopportuneness of the GAT solution, and it tries to 
escape it. Thus, the first conclusion from this decision regarding the 
incompatibility of the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the Brussels 
System with Article 6 of the ECHR, deserves to be approved for all the 
arguments examined in previous sections. 
However, the second conclusion regarding the obligation of the 
Dutch Court to defer the validity issue of the foreign portions of the 
European patent to their respective domestic courts only if nullity 
proceedings were instituted before them, as well as the reasons 
grounding both conclusions of this decision, are not convincing. Thus, 
first even if nullity proceedings were instituted before the respective 
domestic courts of the foreign portions of the European patent, the 
exclusive jurisdiction rules shall still be considered illegal and therefore 
inapplicable for all the arguments already examined in this Section, 
which militate against them.  Second, the alleged differences between 
the case pending before the Dutch Court and the GAT case, namely the 
number of territories involved by the validity claim or the positive or 
 
319.  Id. at 4.4.  Contra Frigo, supra note 7, according to whom the GAT decision 
should be positively evaluated since it grants the principle of legal certainty, in conformity 
with Article 6 of the ECHR.   
320.  Id. at 4.5. 
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negative nature of the infringement claim at stake,321 are indeed to be 
considered irrelevant to the Brussels System’s norms of exclusive 
jurisdiction, as interpreted by the ECJ. 
VI.  COROLLARIES 
A.  General Corollaries 
The conclusions regarding the relation between the exclusive 
jurisdiction rules related to IPR cases and the fundamental human right 
of access to courts Article 6 ECHR, mutatis mutandis, are analogous to 
the conclusions regarding the relation between the same exclusive 
jurisdiction rules and the denial of justice/forum necessitatis rules.  This 
analogy constitutes a final argument in favor of the thesis demonstrated 
here, according to which exclusive jurisdiction rules in IPR cases are not 
imposed either for reasons of comity or by the territoriality principle 
codified in international public law treaties, are even illegal according to 
international public law, and therefore should be abandoned. Those 
conclusions concern IPRs infringement issues, and also IPRs validity 
claims raised as a defense in infringement proceedings. 
B. European Union IPRs 
These conclusions apply also with respect to the European Union 
IPRs, such as the Community trademark.322  Hence, with regard to 
claims related to infringement actions, actions for declaration of non-
infringement, and counterclaims for revocation or for a declaration of 
invalidity of the Community trademarks, Articles 92–94 of the 
Community Trademark Regulation pose “exclusive jurisdiction” rules.323  
However, on the one hand, from an EU member States’ perspective, 
those norms do not ground the international jurisdiction of a sole and 
exclusive competent court, but, rather, establish a plurality of possible 
different competent tribunals, namely of the (trademark) courts of the 
EU member State chosen by the parties according to the Brussels 
Convention (now Brussels I Regulation), or, alternatively, of the EU 
member State where the defendant is domiciled or has an 
establishment, where the plaintiff is domiciled or has an establishment, 
 
321.  Id. at 4.4. 
322.  See Council Regulation 40/94, The Community Trade Mark, 1993 O.J. (L 011) 1 
(EC).  (See the amendments to this Regulation at 
http://oami.europa.eu/en/mark/aspects/reg/reg4094.htm).  
323.  Id. at art. 92–94.   
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where the Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHIM) has 
its seat, or where the infringement has been committed or threatened 
(with the exception of actions for a declaration of non-infringement of a 
Community trade mark.)324  Thus, those “exclusive jurisdiction” rules, 
not being at all exclusive, do not conflict with the norms of public 
international law on denial of justice and on the fundamental human 
right of access to courts. 
On the other hand, from a non EU member States’ perspective, 
Articles 92–94 of the Community Trademark Regulation aim at 
impeding access to courts other than the exclusively competent EU 
tribunals.  Thus, with respect to non-EU countries, Articles 92–94 of the 
Community Trademark Regulation effectively establish exclusive 
jurisdiction rules, even though in favor of more than one EU court.  
Therefore, these rules can conflict with the rules of public international 
law on the denial of justice and on the fundamental human right of 
access to courts. 
The conclusions just reached with respect to the Community 
trademarks also apply in relation to other European and Community IP 
rights, such as plant variety rights325 and design.326 
C. European Unified Patent Judiciary 
Finally, the same conclusions of the here-purported and 
demonstrated thesis, apply with respect to the 2009 Council presidency 
Proposal for the Establishment of a Unified Patent Judiciary (ECPC),327 
 
324.  Id. at art. 92–94.   
325.  See Council Regulation 2100/94, Community plant variety rights, 1994 O.J. (L 227) 
1 (EC). 
326.  See Council Regulation 6/2002, Community designs, 2002 O.J. (L 3) 1 (EC). 
327. See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the European Union patent, COM (2000) 
2000/0177 final (Nov. 28, 2000), available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st16/st16113-ad01.en09.pdf. See also European 
Community Patents Court Draft Agreement, 7928/09 PI 23 COUR 29 (Mar. 23, 2009), 
available at 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/3C42A8FB1B30CA1AC125770D003
0AB65/$File/draft_agreement_European_and_Community_Patents_Court_en.pdf.  See 
Jaeger et al., supra note 149, at 817.  For an historical perspective see Sven J.R. Bostyn, The 
Unbearable Heaviness of Harmonization: SPLT and CP, I BREVETTI PER INVEZIONE FRA 
DIRITTO EUROPEO E NAZIONALE, 128 (Marco Ricolfi ed., 2004); Jurgen Schade, Is The 
Community (EU) Patent Beyond the Times?—Globalisation Urges Multilateral Cooperation, 
INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 806 (2010).  See also Request for an 
opinion submitted by the Council of the European Union pursuant to Article 300(6) EC, 2009 
O.J. (C 220/15); and the “statement of position by the Advocates General” presented on July 
2, 2010 but published over six weeks after the date of July 2 given on the document in French 
(the official language of the document) on a patent lawyer’s blog. See the informal English 
UBERTAZZI - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/2011  1:06 PM 
2011] I.P. RIGHTS AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION 441 
 
which “enjoys the support of the Commission, which is now seeking to 
receive a mandate to open negotiations with States parties to the 
European Patent Convention (EPC) over the Draft Agreement, and to 
obtain an opinion from the ECJ under Article 300.6 EC on the 
compatibility with the EC Treaty.”328  This proposal aims to establish a 
unitary and specialized patent judiciary, a new international 
organization with a central division and several regional and local 
divisions, which will be designated by member States as their national 
exclusively competent court to deal with European patents and 
respectively future Community patents validity and infringement issues.  
Particularly, the ECPC central division will be competent to address the 
actions for revocations, i.e., the validity claims principally raised, the 
validity issues incidentally raised, and all the claims for which are 
competent the local and regional divisions.  In contrast, the ECPC 
regional or local divisions will be competent to address the infringement 
claims (when localized in the State where the defendant is domiciled or, 
alternatively, in the State where the infringement occurs), including 
provisional measures, damages etc., and the revocation counter claims, 
i.e., validity issues incidentally raised.  Then, in the majority of the cases, 
the ECPC will grant unitary litigation with significant positive effects as 
compared to the status quo of fragmented litigation. 
However, the distribution of jurisdiction “requires further 
elaboration in the Proposal or in flanking rules, e.g. insofar as currently 
no common jurisdiction [rules] for actions against multiple 
defendants”329 and consolidation of proceedings related to coordinated 
infringements of European patents are provided. 
Finally, for the limited purposes of this Paper I would just briefly 
mention from a European perspective, the ECPC determines more than 
one competent court and also favors decentralization, lowering “entry 
thresholds (such as language, distance, costs, mentality) for parties to 
the litigation, and is therefore generally to be welcomed.”330  However, 
from a non-European perspective, the ECPC litigation system impedes 
the access to non-EU courts, raising the same concerns as the 
Community Trademark Regulation, particularly where the owner of the 
 
translation of this document at http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2010/08/eu-opinion-
on-the-compatibility-of-the-proposed-european-patent-court-system-with-european-treaty-
la.html.  See also Pagenberg, supra note 219, at 695.  
328.  See Jaeger et al., supra note 149, at 820.  On the request for an ECJ opinion see 
supra note 327.  
329.  See Jaeger et al., supra note 149, at 826. 
330.  Id. 
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European patent does not have enough economic resources to litigate 
its European patent case before the regional or central division of the 
European Patent Court and especially in a language different from its 
own.331 
D. Internal Jurisdiction 
Finally, the here-purported and demonstrated thesis relates to the 
international jurisdiction and does not concern the allocation of 
jurisdiction in purely domestic cases.  Nevertheless, even with respect to 
those cases, when determining the court competent to address an IRPs 
issue, the States shall allow the petitioning of more than one court, 
thereby avoiding a denial of justice and safeguarding the fundamental 
human right of access to courts. 
E. Forum Shopping 
The exclusive jurisdiction rules determine a single forum that has 
international jurisdiction to hear the case, impeding forum shopping, 
and favoring the principle of legal certainty.332  In contrast, one could 
think that the conclusions here proposed favor forum shopping, and 
“are so malleable as to render them non-criteria in practice.”333  Thus, 
one could think that the conclusions proposed here are in contrast to the 
need of legal certainty.  However, it is not so.  First, the conclusions here 
proposed allow the petitioning of a limited number of courts other than 
the one that would have exclusive jurisdiction over the case.  Hence, the 
public international rules considered here do not ground the 
international jurisdiction of whichever court, but rather ground the 
international jurisdiction of the courts of the States to which the case at 
stake is sufficiently and not fortuitously linked, in conformity with the 
 
331.  See Statement of positions by the Advocates General, supra note 327, section c.  
332.  See FRIGO, supra note 7.  
333.  As such see RYNGAERT, supra note 12, at 182, who, however, criticizes these 
critics as adopting a “defeatist approach,” which shall not be embraced.  The author purports 
that a general principle of public international law exists according to which states shall 
exercise their jurisdiction in civil and commercial transnational matters taking duly into 
account the interests of the international community and thus in a reasonable way.  Then, the 
general principle of international law of the reasonable jurisdiction not only “requires that 
States restrain their jurisdiction, but also . . . require[s] them to actually exercise their 
jurisdiction when such would be in the interest of the international community” (p.5).  Thus, 
the reasonableness principle leads to similar conclusions as the general principle of law of the 
access to a court, namely both principles impede the exorbitant fora (p. 165), as much as the 
exclusive jurisdiction ones.  See RYNGAERT, supra note 12, passim, for relevant 
jurisprudential and normative references to the general principle of law of the reasonable 
jurisdiction.  
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general principles of law of proportionality and genuine connection.334  
Also, the conclusions proposed here arise from the international public 
law rules related to the right of access to courts, and as mentioned, those 
rules prevail over the need of legal certainty.335 
Moreover, the existence of more than one court with international 
jurisdiction over the case in question constitutes the typical situation 
according to the Brussels System which establishes a true right to forum 
shopping: this system establishes a general forum and several concurrent 
fora, and while the same system does impose certain exclusive fora, 
those are of an exceptional nature.336  Thus, the concurrent international 
jurisdiction here proposed does not determine a legal uncertainty 
different than that at the basis of the typical situation under the Brussels 
system. 
Finally, it is true that recent decades have seen debate aimed at 
limiting forum shopping with regard to intellectual property cross-
border litigation.  However, this debate aimed at limiting forum 
shopping has arisen only in connection with cases where the adoption 
thereof was abusive.  According to the debate, when “a party abusively 
triggers the jurisdiction of a court in order to obtain an unjust 
advantage, thus practi[c]ing unacceptable forum shopping, the court 
addressed could decline jurisdiction by adopting the ‘corrective 
mechanisms’337 established by its international procedural law rules 
“such as ‘forum non conveniens’ in English Law, or ‘exception de 
fraude’ in French Law,”338 or imposed by the ECHR in granting to the 
defendant the right to be submitted (not to exorbitant jurisdictions) but 
to a fair trial.  Indeed, the here-proposed conclusions do not favor 
abusive forum shopping, but are instead strictly limited to that necessary 
to allow the right of access to courts; and therefore, respect the general 
principle of law imposing the avoidance of the abuse of rights.339 
 
334.  See RYNGAERT, supra note 12, at 145, 148. 
335.  Id. 
336.  On the right of forum shopping see MARTA PERTEGAS SENDER, CROSS-
BORDER ENFORCEMENT OF PATENT RIGHTS 32 (2002); Gilles Cuniberti, Abusive Forum 
Shopping?, CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (May 3, 2010), http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/abusive-
forum-shopping/.  
337.  See FORUM SHOPPING IN THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL AREA (Pascal de Vareilles-
Sommières ed., 2007); Martin George, Publication: Forum Shopping in the European Judicial 
Area, CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (Feb. 8, 2008), http://conflictoflaws.net/2008/publication-
forum-shopping-in-the-european-judicial-area/. 
338.  See George, supra note 337. 
339.  On which see RYNGAERT, supra note 12, at 150. 
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VII. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FORUM STATE FOR 
ITS ILLEGAL DECLINING OF JURISDICTION 
A. Remedies for Denial of Justice 
The exclusive jurisdiction rules in IPRs cases are contrary to the 
avoidance of a denial of justice general principle of law.  From a 
secondary law or responsibility perspective340 the responsibility of a 
State may arise out of improper judicial decisions.341  Therefore, 
declining jurisdiction over a case in conflict with forum necessitatis and 
the right of access to courts triggers an international responsibility of the 
forum State or a non-contractual liability of the European Union.342 
As to forum necessitatis, according also to the Report of the Inter-
American Juridical Committee in 1961, when the forum State declines 
jurisdiction over a case (by virtue of exclusive jurisdiction rules 
established by domestic, EU, or international norms), another State 
may “initiate diplomatic claims for the protection of its nationals . . . 
bringing an action”343 against the forum State and under the conditions 
imposed by international public law to the exercise of diplomatic 
protection344 before an international tribunal competent to address the 
case, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which under 
Article 38.1.c of its statute (and its case law interpretation) is competent 
 
340.  With the term “secondary law” this Paper refers to the “content of the 
international responsibility of a State” and, respectively, “the implementation of the 
international responsibility of a State,” as established in parts II and III of the Draft Articles 
already mentioned.  Precisely, this Paper refers to “the legal consequences” in the 
international legal order “for the responsible State of its internationally wrongful act, in 
particular with respect to cessation and reparation,” and, respectively, to “identifying the 
State or States which may react to an internationally wrongful act and specifying the possible 
modalities by which this may be done” (see the General Commentary n.6 of the Draft 
Articles).  By contrast, as this Paper concentrates on the international dimension of the 
exclusive jurisdiction rules, it does not deal with the consequences of the illegal act in the 
domestic legal systems involved.  However, reference should be made to the circumstance 
that “the responsibility of a State may not be invoked if: / (a) the claim is not brought in 
accordance with any applicable rule relating to the nationality of claims; / (b) the claim is one 
to which the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies and any available and effective local 
remedy has not been exhausted” (as such Article 44 of the Draft Articles on Admissibility of 
Claims). 
341.  Draft Articles, supra note 157, at ch. IV.E.1 on Article 4 Conduct of organs of a 
State according to which “1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that 
State under international law, whether the organ exercises . . . judicial [functions].”  
342.  See PAULSSON, supra note 107, at 207. 
343.  See the references in Francioni, supra note 107, at 11. 
344.  On the condition imposed by international public law on the exercise of 
diplomatic protection, among which the expiring of the internal ways of recourse and its 
being a residual remedy, see CONFORTI, supra note 42, at 213.  
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to adjudicate the violations of the general principles of law.  In such a 
case, the competent international tribunal could force the forum State 
that improperly declined jurisdiction, inter alia, the reopening of the 
proceedings345 and the exercise of jurisdiction over the case.  In this 
sense, the Belgian State recently brought an action before the ICJ 
against Switzerland for having adopted private international law lato 
sensu rules to decline (not its jurisdiction but) to enforce certain 
Belgium decisions.346  However, States generally do not initiate 
diplomatic protection in favor of their nationals for the illegal use of 
private international norms by another country, even where such 
implies denial of justice.347 
Furthermore, when the rule adopted to decline jurisdiction over a 
case is an EU norm, the plaintiff can bring an action directly against the 
European Union before the European Court of Justice under Article 
268 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),348 
which states that “[t]he Court of Justice of the European Union shall 
have jurisdiction in disputes relating to compensation for damage 
provided for in the second . . . paragraph[] of Article 340,”349 which 
states that “in the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in 
accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the 
Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions . . . in 
the performance of their duties,”350 such as the legislative duty. The ECJ 
 
345.  See Case Concerning Avena v. United States (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 
31).  See also PAULSSON, supra note 107, at 207. 
346.  See Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(Belg. v. Switz.), Application, 2009 I.C.J. 1 (Dec. 22), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&code=besu&case=145&k=e6. On this case see Caroline 
Kleiner, Private International Law Dispute Before the ICJ (Belgium v. Switzerland on the 
Interpretation and Application of the Lugano Convention), CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (Dec. 27, 
2009), http://conflictoflaws.net/?s=Private+International+Law+Dispute+Before+the+ICJ; 
Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, Una controversia relativa alla Convenzione di Lugano giunge 
innanzi alla Corte internazionale di giustizia, 2 SOCIETA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO 
INTERNAZIONALE 454 (2010), available at http://www.sidi-isil.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/nota-Marongiu-Buonaiuti_.pdf. 
347.  However, see Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 
(Sept. 7).  On this case see supra notes 9, 11, 15.  In an action brought by the Netherlands 
before the ICJ against Sweden for having this last State violated the conflict of laws rules of 
an international convention see Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the 
Guardianship of Infant (Neth. v. Swed.) 1958 I.C.J. 55 (Nov. 28). 
348.  Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community 2006 O.J. (C 321 E/2), Article 235 (TEC). 
349.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
2008 O.J. (C 115/47), Article 268; ex. Article 288 TEC. 
350.  Id. at Article 340.  
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has held that 
 
Community law confers a right to reparation where three 
conditions are met: the rule of law infringed must be 
intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must 
be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal 
link between the breach of the obligation [by the EU 
Institution] . . . and the damage sustained by the injured 
parties[,]351 
 
and must also be a “higher-ranking rule of law.”352  Thus, with reference 
to the first condition, the ECJ maintained that a rule of law confers 
rights upon individuals when it poses “the right to be heard” by a 
court,353 and hence “it is foreseeable”354 that such a rule can be 
characterized as a high-ranking rule of law. 
B.  Remedies for Violation of the Fundamental Human Right of Access 
to Courts 
As for the fundamental human right of access to courts, and always 
from a secondary law or responsibility perspective, the content of the 
responsibility of the States, mutatis mutandis, is the same as that related 
to the violation of forum necessitatis, save for the following peculiarities 
of the ECHR system.  First, when the declining of jurisdiction is 
grounded on the domestic rules of the forum State, the applicant can 
petition the forum State before the ECtHR according to ECHR 
mechanisms.  Second, when the declining of jurisdiction is based on 
treaty norms, the applicant can petition the forum State before the 
ECtHR, since member States of the ECHR violate its Article 6, even 
when they limit the applicant’s right of access to courts to give effect to 
the rules of an international agreement.  Third, when the declining of 
jurisdiction is based on EU norms, the applicant can still petition the 
forum State before the ECtHR. 
In those cases, the ECtHR’s Bosphorus jurisprudence applies, 
according to which “the protection of fundamental rights by EC law can 
 
351.  Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland & Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, 1996 E.C.R. I-1029, ¶ 51.   
352.  See Case C-352/98, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA v. Comm’n, 
2000 E.C.J. 42, ¶ 17, available at http://curia.europa.eu. 
353.  Case T-193/04, Tillack v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. II-3995,  ¶ 127. 
354.  See MASSIMO CONDINANZI & ROBERTO MASTROIANNI, IL CONTENZIOSO 
DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA 280 (2009). 
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be considered to be . . . ‘equivalent’ . . . to that of the Convention 
system.”355  “By ‘equivalent’ the Court means ‘comparable’ . . . [rather 
than] ‘identical’.356  Therefore, “presumption arises that [the forum EU 
member State] did not depart from the requirements of the Convention 
when it implemented legal obligations flowing from its membership of 
the EC.”357 
 
[On the one hand this] presumption can be rebutted if, in 
the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered 
that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly 
deficient.  In such cases, the interest of international 
cooperation would be outweighed by the Convention’s 
role as a ‘constitutional instrument of European public 
order’ in the field of human rights . . . [and the 
defendant] State would be fully responsible under the 
Convention [for the violation of the right of access to 
courts].358 
 
On the other hand, the future accession of the European Union to 
the ECHR according to Article 6.2 TEU will reasonably override the 
presumption posed by the Bosphorus jurisprudence and has been 
correctly criticized by the opinion of several judges also comprising the 
Grand Chamber that enacted it.  Hence, it is true that according to 
Article 2 of the Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty n. 8 Relating to Article 6(2) 
of the Treaty on European Union on the Accession of the Union to the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights, “[t]he 
agreement relating to the accession . . . shall make provision for 
preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union 
law . . . .”359  However, as it was recently correctly noted,360 it is the 
 
355. Turizm v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, ¶ 165 (2005) available at 
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.  See M. & Co. v. Germany, App. No. 13258/87 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990), 
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int, last page. 
356.  Turizm, App. No. 45036/98, ¶ 155. 
357.  Id. at ¶ 165.  
358.  Id. at ¶156–157. 
359.  Relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the Accession of 
the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12007L/htm/C2007306EN.01015501.htm. 
360.  See Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, L’adesione Dell’UE alla CEDU: Il ‘Nodo 
Giudiziario,’ ITALIAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW XV CONGRESS IN BOLOGNA 
(June 10–11, 2010), available at http://streaming.cineca.it/SIDI-
UBERTAZZI - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/2011  1:06 PM 
448  MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:2 
 
European Union that is accessing to the ECHR, and not vice versa.  
Furthermore, the privileged system posed by Bosphorus in favor of the 
European Union will not be tolerable to all other non-EU member 
States that are party to the ECHR, especially when accession of the 
European Union will place it on an equal footing with them. 
At any rate, the ECtHR very recently established that the 
equivalence of the European Union and the ECHR systems shall be 
evaluated not in the abstract but on a case-by-case basis, in a realistic 
and not merely theoretical way.361  The ECtHR, at the same time, 
“expanded the subjective and objective scope of the State 
responsibility” in relation to international organization, by stating in the 
Gasparini decision362 that “member States are obliged, when they 
transfer a part of their sovereign powers to an international 
organi[z]ation to which they adhere, to scrutini[z]e that the rights 
granted by the Convention will receive in the frame of the international 
organi[z]ation an ‘equivalent protection’ to that of the Convention 
system.”363 
Finally, in all those cases according to the ECtHR “the most 
appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be trial de novo or the 
reopening of the proceedings, in due course and in accordance with the 
requirements of Article 6 of the Convention.”364 
 
XV/play.php?dim_get=320&player_get=flash&flusso_get=flash. 
361.  See Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlands Kokkelvisserij U.A. v. 
Netherlands, App. No. 13645/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
362.  See Gasparini v. Italia and Belgium, App. No. 10750/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), 
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int (only available in French).  
363.  Id.  “[L]es Etats membres ont l'obligation, au moment où ils transfèrent une 
partie de leurs pouvoirs souverains à une organisation [sic] internationale à laquelle ils 
adhèrent, de veiller à ce que les droits garantis par la Convention reçoivent au sein de cette 
organisation [sic] une ‘protection équivalente’ à celle assurée par le mécanisme de la 
Convention.” 
364.  See Somogyi v. Italy, App. No. 67972/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 86 (2004), available at 
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
